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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the shift in governance structures, bargains, and processes in the 
Saskatchewan uranium industry between the 1970s and 2000s.  Using a framework based on 
international political economy, the thesis analyzes the security, production, financial and 
knowledge structures that shaped the environment of the province‟s uranium industry.  In 
addition, an analysis of bargains created between and among structures helps provide further 
insight into the industry.  Through this type of analysis, the thesis draws comparisons between 
the Allan Blakeney New Democratic Party and the Brad Wall Saskatchewan Party governments‟ 
attempts to expand the uranium cycle in Saskatchewan.  Due to conditions both internal and 
external to their administrations, the Blakeney and Wall governments engaged in two different 
processes, one closed and one open.  
Looking at these two events through content analysis, studying official statements, public 
documents, government positions and media reports, this thesis explores the circumstances that 
engendered two different processes and the outcomes each process produced.  The 1970s and 80s 
refinery debate relied on a state-centric process that limited relationships with the industrial 
sector and the societal sector.  These factors contributed to the failure of the provincial 
government to win the refinery contract.  Given different governance structures during this era, 
the outcome reached for the refinery may have been different.  Two decades later, the nuclear 
energy debate in the 2000s benefitted from evolved governance structures.  The state engaged in 
a stronger working relationship with industry and a more open discourse with the public.  
However, the increased governing versatility remained unable to counteract economic forces at 
the global level.  Both cases exemplify the difficulty expanding an industry as complex and 
contentious as uranium despite substantial change in governance models. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 Environmental changes driven by global warming and international economic security 
make questions concerning energy alternatives increasingly important.  Energy is essential to our 
way of life in Canada and other Western countries but our current usage is creating two critical 
problems.  First, using fossil fuels for energy is exacerbating global environmental problems by 
producing carbon dioxide, which contributes to global warming. Second, procuring petroleum 
from foreign sources such as the Middle East and Russia leaves the West in a vulnerable position 
in terms of energy security.  These problems place increasing pressure on policy makers to 
search for viable alternative energy sources such as wind, solar and nuclear.  Where nuclear 
energy fits into this future is an important question moving forward, especially for Saskatchewan 
in that it is uniquely situated to play a central role because of its ample supply of uranium.  In 
2009, Saskatchewan led high grade uranium production globally.  Third, the recent global 
isotope shortages open the opportunity to expand the uranium industry supply chain outside of 
energy production.  The medical sector represents an area of expansion that takes advantage of 
state relationships with institutions such as the University of Saskatchewan, underscoring the 
widening base of uranium networks in the province. 
Since the discovery of uranium in the 1930s, the resource has been an important source of 
revenue and employment for the province.  Provincial policy on uranium development has not 
changed fundamentally, however, over the past two decades, and public discussion of uranium 
mining and the broader uranium industry in Saskatchewan has not been at the fore since the 
Warman refinery debates in the 1970s and 80s.   In the face of public opposition, the New 
Democratic Party (NDP) provincial government shelved its plans for expansion of the nuclear 
industry in the 1970-80s.  However, with the election of the Saskatchewan Party in 2007, the 
direction of the uranium industry is, once again, the centre of media and public attention.  Are 
circumstances such that the debate will be, as Yogi Berra once said, “déjà vu all over again”? Or, 
have circumstances changed?  By examining the efforts to expand the uranium industry of the 
NDP government led by Premier Allan Blakeney in 1970s those of the Saskatchewan Party 
government led by Premier Brad Wall in the 2000s; this thesis seeks to understand both 
continuities and changes in the role of the provincial state in determining uranium policy in 
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Saskatchewan.  This understanding may prove to be crucial in whether or not the current efforts 
to expand the nuclear industry in Saskatchewan will be successful. 
1.2 The Problem Statement 
 The energy sector faces new challenges due to the combination of climate change and 
dwindling petroleum reserves.  For a majority of the province‟s history, Saskatchewan remained 
content with exporting uranium to Ontario and foreign nations who produced nuclear energy.  
However, two attempts in the past thirty years aimed at changing the uranium industry in 
Saskatchewan.  The Blakeney and Wall governments both tried to expand the uranium cycle in 
the province.  This thesis focuses on the evolving roles of the provincial government in the 
uranium industry in the context of these two efforts.  The uranium producers, the uranium and 
power buyers, various municipalities, a range of business and community groups all had a role in 
the discussion.  Their roles are investigated as needed to investigate the provincial role. 
Although several related questions may arise in the study and analyses performed in this 
project, the primary question is, how does the evolving role of the state impact the policy 
outcomes in the Saskatchewan uranium industry?  And more specifically, what were the roles of 
the provincial state during the policy process for the Warman refinery, and what were its roles in 
the nuclear energy debates in Saskatchewan? 
1.3  Focus and Objectives 
 This thesis uses background literature, formal documentation, policy documents and 
contemporary media reports to trace both the evolution of the policies and roles of the provincial 
government in the Saskatchewan uranium industry from 1970 to 2010, and identify possible 
factors that account for that evolution. Regarding the roles of the provincial government, the 
focus is on two key areas: (1) its roles in the Warman uranium refinery debate and (2) its roles in 
the 2007-09 nuclear power debate.  In examining the policies related to each of the 
aforementioned matters, the focus is on the policy decisions made by successive provincial 
governments related to the policy and regulatory framework in this particular policy sector.  
 Concerning the roles of the provincial governments, the principal focus pertains to the 
extent to which the provincial government performed any of the following: a policy/regulatory 
role, an ownership or operational role, or public education and public consultation (i.e., studies 
and public consultations). And, insofar as the provincial governments have performed any of 
3 
 
those roles, the thesis examines whether they performed an exclusive role, a lead role, a 
partnership role, or no role in each of the stages of nuclear energy cycle.  
 With respect to the factors that account for the policies and the roles of the provincial 
governments in this policy sector, the thesis focuses on the effects of political, economic, and 
societal factors.   
1.4 Analytical Framework  
The analytical framework draws from both international political economy and policy 
networks literature.  This thesis devotes special attention to the uranium policy debate from a 
political perspective, looking at the relationships between government and industry and 
government and civil society.  When the state becomes increasingly dynamic, it forces the formal 
power structure to decentralize, leading to changes in the institutions and the rules that govern 
society.  These types of evolutions in governance have occurred in the past, but Michalski et al. 
argue that “what distinguishes these shifts from previous ones is that they will largely depend on 
the emergence of a mutually reinforcing relationship between, on the one hand, a significant 
diffusion throughout society of governance capacities and, on the other, higher degrees of 
technological, economic, and social dynamism.”1  The degree to which these types of changes 
will occur likely depends on the existing institutional structure and the willingness of 
government to allow more external input in policy processes. Although economies and civil 
society enjoy increasing influence on policy and help shape institutions in various sectors, key 
decision-making in the Saskatchewan uranium industry still requires approval of government.  
Therefore, this thesis approaches the uranium policy debate from a political angle.   
Strange presents international political economy within a framework of four power 
structures: security, production, finance and knowledge.  Inherent in this framework are 
normative principles on how the system as a whole ought to operate, specifically through what 
theoretical lens political and economic problems ought to be viewed.  Strange presents three 
basic social values: wealth and efficient production, order and security, and justice and equality, 
each of which fit into a competing theoretical model.
2
  The liberal approach favours minimal 
state control over trade, free markets and free trade ought to prevail.  The realist approach 
                                                 
1
 Michalski, Wolfgang, Riel Miller and Barrie Stevens.  “Governance in the 21st Century: Power in the Global 
Knowledge Economy and Society.” OECD Governance in the 21st Century (2001):14. 
2
 Strange, Susan.  States and Markets.  2
nd
 ed. New York: Pinter Publishers, 1988, 3. 
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favours trade regulations that benefit domestic industry, particularly when regulation gives the 
home nation advantage over foreign nations.  The Marxist or dependency approach favours high 
state control over markets in order to protect against exploitation of the periphery by the core.  
Normative principles, therefore, often help guide the analysis in international political economy.  
However, in this study, the normative principles remained the same and the socio-economic 
goals of the Blakeney and Wall governments largely coincide.  Both wanted expansion of a local 
industry for economic benefit to the province, in both capital gains and job creation.  Therefore, 
since socio-economic interests held between governments, the analysis does not require a 
comparison of normative principles and social values. 
 The international political economy literature identifies the sectors, organizations, and 
actors central to the uranium policy arena.  Five common themes recognized in cluster case 
studies include learning, labour, leadership, legislation and location.  Wolfe argues that the 
successful combination of these themes leads to successful industries.
3
  In the case of the 
Saskatchewan uranium industry, these themes are particularly pertinent.  Bratt also 
acknowledges that such a multi-thematic approach to nuclear power is required to recognize the 
current challenges and future opportunities that lay ahead for the province.
4
 
 Looking at these actors from a policy perspective and determining their roles and efficacy 
within these governance models is another component to the analysis in this thesis.  The policy 
networks model examines the actors involved in policy making within specific timeframes.  
Teisman states, “focus, therefore, should be on the interaction among purposeful actors.  To gain 
insight into policy making, the researcher depicts which actors are participating at what time.  
Actors are units capable of developing a recognizable course of action (individuals, groups or 
collective/corporate entities).”5 This model of policy making identifies rounds of uranium policy-
making in Saskatchewan, identifying actors involved in each round and the problems presented 
and policy solutions found.  Although individuals and ideas frequently contribute to a policy 
process, the analytical focus of this thesis is on the role of institutions.  Because governments 
approach policy within an institutional framework, emphasis in this thesis is placed on 
institutional policies and institutional decision-making.  Nevertheless, this model  helps to 
                                                 
3
 Wolfe, David A.  Clusters Old and New. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 2003, 25. 
4
 Bratt, Duane.  “Prairie Atoms: The Opportunities and Challenges of Nuclear Power in Alberta and Saskatchewan.”  
Canada West Foundation: Going for Gold (2008): 4. 
5 Teisman, Geert R.  “Models for Research into Decision-Making Processes: On Phases, Streams and Decision-
Making Rounds.”  Public Administration vol. 78, no. 4 (2000): 944. 
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understand uranium policy in Saskatchewan‟s past as well as looking to future rounds of policy 
and decision-making and to which actors will likely be involved.   
1.5 Methodology  
 This thesis approaches the analyses of the uranium policy in Saskatchewan 
diachronically.  Beginning with the first uranium discoveries in the 1930s, key events in the 
province‟s history are studied looking at the actors involved, the decisions reached and the 
models of governance that have emerged and evolved.   
 In using this framework it becomes necessary to analyze each actor using official 
statements, both corporate and government documents.  These documents both aid in 
understanding the purpose and intent of these actors and provide insight into the relationships.  
Interviews from individuals in government, industry, and research institutions gave direction to 
the thesis and helped frame the analysis.  However, interviews conducted with participants in the 
refinery process over twenty years after the events took place were judged to pose too great a 
risk of retrospective analysis. Given that this thesis examines two periods divided by 20 years 
there is a very real chance that the degree of objectivity and insight would vary widely for the 
two cases.  For methodological reasons the decision was made not to draw any conclusions 
between interviews conducted related to the two policy process, unless they could be 
substantiated by industrial or government documents or media reports.  Because of the inability 
to conduct interviews both in the 1970s and the 2000s, they were not used as a primary source.  
Therefore, the interviews did not inform the conclusions drawn in this thesis.  Together official 
documentation, prior academic research and informal interviews provided the information 
needed to apply the frameworks and develop conclusions.   
1.6 Importance of the Thesis 
 This research is important for the following reasons: it provides new insights on the 
participants, perspectives and outcomes of Saskatchewan‟s uranium history; it reflects recent 
developments in the province; it provides critical findings in the area of uranium policy; and it 
serves as a model both to understanding the policy process in the province and to looking at 
Saskatchewan as one of many governments and economies facing similar circumstances.   
Methodologically, this thesis is one of the first substantive uses of the Blakeney Papers to 
examine a public policy problem that emerged in his regime. 
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1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
 This thesis contains six chapters.  Chapter one introduces the problem and sets the 
parameters of the historical and empirical facets of this thesis.  Chapter two discusses the 
framework of analysis for the thesis, pointing out key elements of international political 
economy literature that will be applied in this thesis.  Chapter three explores the story of uranium 
in Saskatchewan, looking back at its early history from the 1930s to the present.  Chapter four 
examines the processes during the Warman refinery debates with a particular focus on 
governance structures.  Chapter five looks at the most recent nuclear energy debate from a 
similar perspective and draws comparisons between the two events.  Chapter six provides an 
overview and analysis of the two key uranium debates in Saskatchewan and presents the findings 
of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORY AND FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
2.1 Introduction 
 Since the challenges and opportunities created by uranium affect the decisions of the 
provincial government, private sector and the public, a broad analysis of governance structures 
provides a relatively comprehensive approach to studying the uranium industry in Saskatchewan.  
Governance of the Saskatchewan uranium industry has changed since the initial decision to mine 
in the 1950s, when the decision making process rested primarily with government.  More 
recently, discussions of pursuing value-added components to the uranium life cycle, including 
the Warman refinery debates and the current discussion of the potential for nuclear energy, has 
expanded the policy process; therefore, focusing solely on the provincial government's policy on 
uranium would miss critical components of the entire policy process.  Thus, the analysis of 
resource policy in Saskatchewan should be broad in scope and include market and social forces.   
 This chapter sets out a framework of analysis that discusses theory on the roles of the 
state, identifies the key structures of the uranium industry in Saskatchewan, maps the network of 
actors involved in the industry, and recognizes the bargains within the network.  International 
political economy provides a framework that addresses these three areas: the state, market and 
society.
6
  While theoretical perspectives on the roles of the state include the changes to 
governance models and diffusion of state powers, political economy investigates the structures, 
institutions and policies that govern the system and how they change, and networks and bargains 
explores connections between the institutions and actors, linking these connections to real-world 
outcomes.  Hence, a study through this framework is the most likely approach to yield important 
insights not only into the development of the Saskatchewan uranium industry but also into the 
evolution of governance structures.             
                                                 
6
 Picciotto, Robert.  “Putting Institutional Economics to Work: From Participation to Governance.”  World Bank 
Discussion Papers 304 (1995): 12. 
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                                                       Figure 2.1 
 
2.2 Changes in Theoretical Perspectives on the Roles of the State 
 Analysis in the field of political science traditionally focuses on the state as the sole 
policy maker; however, the state‟s role as the primary policy maker has changed and, as a result, 
its responsibilities have changed commensurately.  Consequently, much of the change, inherent 
in liberal democratic governments that now exist in the Western world, also appears in Canada 
and Saskatchewan.  Further, the combination of the democratic process and the competitive 
nature of a capitalist economy means that the character of governance systems exhibits 
significant increases in economic, social, and cultural interdependence.
7
  Advances in technology 
- driven by consumers and promoted by government - redistribute many of the responsibilities to 
the markets and society.  In addition, the forces of globalization, open trade and communication, 
in turn, enable common interests that do not require compliance to the rules of traditional 
authorities but, rather, challenge these authorities and diffuses power to new actors.
8
  Defining 
the role of the market in the Saskatchewan uranium industry, however, remains challenging.  
Markets may exhibit pure optimization or, alternatively, strict state regulation; however, most 
cases fall somewhere in between.  Market actors now operate in Saskatchewan‟s uranium 
industry, but state regulation continues to influence their activity.   
 The diffusion of power to the technological, economic, and social forces means that 
responsibility and policy decision-making are no longer heavily centralized and, actors not 
previously involved now play a role in the process.  In addition, the scope of possible action 
changed with the evolution of technology and its subsequent impact on the economy.  
Technology fundamentally changes the decision-making process due to its speed and reach, 
which places pressure on policy-makers to respond quickly.  Additionally, as technology 
                                                 
7
 Michalski, Miller and Stevens, 15. 
8
 Michalski, Miller and Stevens, 15. 
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improves, and becomes more complex and interconnected the pressure further increases.  The 
complexities, found in the uranium industry, task policy makers in Saskatchewan with the 
difficult job of ensuring high levels of uranium production in the province while, at the same 
time, staying aware of new opportunities.   
 The importance of technology in governance can also be understood in two ways: 
governing of technology and governing with technology.
9
  Governing of technology refers to the 
work of elected officials to promote development of technology both in terms of physical objects 
and human skill.  Governing with technology refers to the understanding of how technology 
affects methods of governance, including increased capacity of the state due to advances in 
technology.  These new tools of governance through technology mean that responsibility across 
government, business, and society also change.  The result of the diffusion of power and 
decision-making authority gives the possibility of a more dynamic and productive society.  These 
governance structures and dynamics already exist in Saskatchewan but inherent in their nature is 
a continual evolution.  How this evolution fits in the Saskatchewan context and in particular the 
energy sector emerges as the fundamental question.   
 In summary, as the public becomes more involved, business gains greater responsibility, 
and technology emerges as a driving force behind evolving perceptions and relationships, 
governance changes.  Salamon states, “the new governance also shifts the attention from 
hierarchic agencies to organizational networks.”10  Salamon continues, “The defining 
characteristic of many of the most widely used, and most rapidly expanding, tools, as we have 
seen, is their indirect character, their establishment of interdependencies between public agencies 
and a host of third-party actors.”11    
As hierarchical authority (top-down) shifts to more dispersed forms of governance found 
at both the macro and micro levels and the state no longer has the authority it once had – human 
rights, environmental security, free markets and the like have emerged and challenge the 
traditional power structures at all levels of society – a rethinking of past policy analysis is needed 
to match the diversity of the structures and networks.   
                                                 
9
 Perri 6, “Governing by Technique: Judgment and the Prospects for Governance of and with Technology” in OECD 
Governance in the 21
st
 Century, (2001): 71. 
10
 Salamon, Lester M.  The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance.  New York: Oxford Press, 2002, 
11. 
11
 Salamon, 11. 
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The Saskatchewan uranium industry, therefore, is an example of a sector in which 
collaboration and cooperation between government, business, and the public sector is driven by 
technological advancement. 
2.3 Political Economy Structures 
 Pertinent to this study is the theory of political economy structures.  Power in the political 
economy sense is the ability to shape the structure as a whole.  Two types of power exist.  First, 
relational power is the realist understanding of power that allows one state to force another state 
to do something they normally would not.  Second, structural power is the ability to shape the 
structures of the international political economy (IPE) and to force other states and institutions to 
work within these established structures.  It decides how things operate and how relations 
between states are defined.
12
  Strange explains that it is based on four distinct structures working 
together: security, knowledge, finance and production.
13
  She likens it to a tetrahedron; where 
each structure represents one side, every side touching the other, and each holding the shape in 
place.  None of the structures is more important than any other and each is necessary to create 
structural power and its processes.   
 The first structure, security, is defined as the protection from the threat of violence, the 
greater the threat present, the higher the price for security and the distribution of goods.  Those 
who provide security also control non-security matters such as sustenance and justice.  The 
second structure, control over production, pertains to the control over land, labor, capital and 
technology.  This control gives power to define social structures, establish constitutions and 
build institutions that enable those with control over production to remain in control.  In a basic 
political science understanding, this can be viewed as the power of one class over another.  
Within the IPE context this can mean that class control can extend beyond national borders, both 
empowering and disenfranchising.  The third structure refers to finance and the ability to control 
credit.   It emphasizes investments in the economy through the creation of credit.  As Strange 
points out, the technological advances in recent history have been so great and rapid that they 
would not have been possible without credit creation.
14
  Credit, however, is only possible 
through trust and confidence in institutions that will control the economy.    Finally, the fourth 
                                                 
12
 Strange, 25. 
13
 Strange, 26. 
14
 Strange, 30. 
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structure is knowledge.  Control over this structure rests with those who have the ability to 
develop and possess the knowledge and subsequently allow or deny others access to this 
knowledge.  Because knowledge fuels new technology, it is immensely important in determining 
the progress made within the other structures. 
   
                               Figure 2.2 
 
 Another key determinant in structures, particularly relevant to the uranium industry, is 
regulatory policy, created at both the federal level and the provincial level.  Determined largely 
by the state, regulation creates limits within which all actors in the four structures must operate; 
ranging from determining export destinations and mining output in security and finance, while 
creating energy contracts and issuing research grants in finance and knowledge.  Therefore, how 
regulation came into policy remains key in this analysis with respect to the impact on the four 
structures.  Analytical comparison between the 1970s and 2000s gives insight into the change in 
government‟s approach to regulation and risk management.  The first comprehensive piece 
published on risk assessment came in 1983, the National Research Council‟s “Risk Assessment 
in the Federal Government: Managing the Process,” also referred to as the “Red Book.”  Aimed 
at changing the perception of risk, the “Red Book” aimed as eliminating emotional decision-
making to one based primarily on scientific research, experimentation, and evaluation.
15
  With 
the evolution in risk management comes evolution in regulatory policy.  Decision-making by 
                                                 
15
 National Research Council.  Risk Assessment in the Federal Government.  Washington D.C.: National Academy 
Press, 1983, 1. 
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government on industry regulation relies more heavily on scientific data and the uranium 
industry is no different, regulation remains important to each structure but the mechanisms 
informing government decision-making changed.  State-owned corporations require no 
additional regulation from government and, therefore, as the privatization of Crown corporations 
in Saskatchewan occurred, the need for government regulation increased.  Therefore, the role 
government played in the four structures shifted from a direct approach to a regulatory one. 
The structures model is a valuable tool in identifying the basic structures of international 
political economy and the impact of innovation.  But one needs to also look more closely at the 
specific institutions and actors involved, especially the smaller structures within any innovation 
system.  Five common themes are recognized in relevant literature: learning, labour, leadership, 
legislation and location.  Wolfe points out that learning plays a critical role in the innovation 
process for both old and emerging industries; in the case of uranium in Saskatchewan this applies 
to current players in the market such as Cameco and possible new entries in the market like 
Bruce Power.
16
  Importantly, however, learning not only occurs within individual firms but also 
across firm boundaries and related institutions.  On the other hand, labour and local talent in the 
workforce are crucial determinants of regional-industrial success.  The success of labour, 
however, relies on creating skill and talent from within and attracting new skill and talent from 
without.  In addition to labour, leadership plays a valuable role in determining the organization 
of industries themselves and their cooperation with each other.  Leaders from the private sector 
and from the community work together to structure development for the greatest benefit to 
society.  Besides leadership, legislation is often one of the defining factors in the direction of the 
private sector.  While many see state interference in market operations as an obstacle to progress, 
legislation and law can be essential in building knowledge infrastructure such as universities, 
colleges, government labs, and other research and technology-transfer organizations.
17
  Finally, 
“location matters.” This is especially true when looking at the Saskatchewan uranium industry, 
both in terms of the potential due to natural geography and the opportunity to build from existing 
infrastructure.  However, the networks and bargains between the institutions, organizations and 
individuals within the uranium industry are equally important and must be given their due 
attention. 
                                                 
16
 Wolfe, 26. 
17
 Wolfe, 27. 
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The abstract idea of structures presented by Strange can be applied in a very real way to 
understanding the uranium industry in Saskatchewan.  Because the applications for the resource 
are broad and implications of its use far reaching, then so too must the framework for studying 
uranium industry be a multifaceted approach.  Recognizing the structures and how they have 
changed throughout Saskatchewan‟s history is one step in understanding uranium policy.   
For Saskatchewan these responsibilities undergo a shift from state to market, particularly with 
regard to the capacity of resource extraction and energy production.   
Change in governance requires a more encompassing approach to the study of uranium 
policy.  As a resource, uranium is important to a number of different institutions and 
organizations.  Mining has been critical a component to the Saskatchewan economy and uranium 
continues to be an asset to the industry.  The product derived from mining operations has an even 
greater range of impact which includes security implications, both from military and societal 
perspectives, and knowledge creation.  The value of research and development related to 
uranium has converted it into a source of energy.  The relationship between these different forces 
underpins shifts in structural power.   
2.4 Networks and Bargains 
 Identifying the structure of the existing institutions is the foundation for the analysis of 
the state and governance in the uranium industry, but deeper analysis is needed to focus on the 
networks and bargains that make the structures function.  The framework provided by 
governance analysis gives a basis for recognizing what factors play critical roles in successful 
industries and they interact and influence how the state and market must work together when 
creating policy.  Increasingly, the role of civil voice must not be ignored if policy is aimed at 
providing the best societal outcomes.  This has been proven true for other industries and this 
thesis will demonstrate its applicability to uranium in Saskatchewan.  Atkinson and Coleman in 
their piece, “Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance” look at 
how our views on policymaking must now shift to coincide with the true nature of the process.  
States and bureaucracies should not be recognized as autonomous actors – instead the state-
society relationships must be acknowledged.  This makes analysis more complex but more 
thorough, and the authors call this type of model “policy network” or “policy community.”  With 
these terms they suggest “a renewed attempt to be both encompassing and discriminating in 
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describing the policy process: encompassing because they refer to actors and relationships in the 
policy process that take us beyond the political-bureaucratic relationship; discriminating because 
they suggest the presence of many communities and different types of networks.”18  They argue 
that the workings of governance and the path to policy creation is not as straightforward as many 
believe.  Instead the methods for policy creation will differ greatly across policy domains within 
a single state.  Each domain will include different outside actors in policy discussion and debate.  
What is clear then is the importance of shared knowledge and consultation required in the policy 
making process.  States cannot push agendas simply because of preference; the process is 
significantly more complex.   
 The Teisman “rounds” model of policy analysis looks beyond the state and bureaucracy 
which is akin to the idea of policy networks described by Atkinson and Coleman.  Teisman 
argues, “focus…should be on the interaction among purposeful actors.  Rather than using the 
phases or streams models of policy which limit the scope of the analysis, the rounds model gives 
the researcher a holistic view of the policy making process, a depiction of which actors are 
participating at what time in the entire process.  Actors are units capable of developing a 
recognizable course of action (individuals, groups or collective/corporate entities).”19  This type 
of analysis gives value to actors that are sometimes ignored in the study of policy making, the 
problem that Atkinson and Coleman point out.  Using this model of policy making, this thesis 
identifies rounds of uranium policy in Saskatchewan, actors involved in each round, problems 
presented, and policy solutions found.  This model both helps to illuminate the uranium policy in 
Saskatchewan‟s past and it looks to future rounds of policy decision making and to actors that 
will likely be involved. 
Figure 2.3 
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 Within any network there exists a series of bargains between pertinent actors that make 
the system work and that provide context and rationale for the decision-making processes in the 
structures.  Strange describes the use of bargains as, “analysis of a particular situation so as to 
discern in more detail where a government, a political movement or a corporate enterprise has a 
range of feasible choices, and what possible scenarios might follow, depending on which choices 
are made.”20  A resource such as uranium is highly complex and creates multiple political and 
moral dilemmas not found with other resources.  The analysis of bargains is, therefore, relatively 
valuable when applied to this industry.  Saskatchewan provides clear examples where decisions 
were made, due to the existing set of bargains, yet, as these bargains were reassessed, new policy 
paths were followed. 
 Bargains take the form of codified or tacit, explicit or implicit agreements.  When 
identifying and comparing the efficacy of multiple bargains it is necessary to acknowledge that 
implicit and tacit bargains can be just as or more important than codified or explicit bargains.  
However, in all cases, bargains exist as a means for groups or individuals to gain additional 
power or influence.  Bargains are central to political economy because of their ability to give 
actors power.  Power and bargains are therefore continually interconnected and actors will 
always remain interested in engaging in new bargains.  Phillips writes, “bargains in political 
economy provide a means for people to acquire power.  The quest for power and the forging of 
bargains are therefore closely intertwined.  Almost everyone would welcome an opportunity to 
bargain to increase their power.”21  Bargains can, however, only create power in relationships 
and situations that have the potential for increased power.  Bargains can lead to a shift in power 
and, in the case of new governance with the resulting diffusion of responsibility, become critical.  
In Saskatchewan, the ineffective bargains between the provincial government and Eldorado 
Mining that existed during the Warman refinery discussions resulted in solutions found outside 
the province.  Has the nature of the bargains with the private sector changed and what will this 
mean for the potential of nuclear power in the province? 
 Codified and explicit bargains are created in scenarios where terms are openly discussed 
and agreed upon and sometimes take legal form.  These formal agreements and policies leave 
less room for interpretation of the terms between the parties and therefore outcomes are easier to 
                                                 
20
 Strange, 39. 
21
 Phillips, Peter W.B.  Wheat, Europe and the GATT.  London: Pinter Publishers, 1990, 9. 
16 
 
predict or, alternatively, cases of a breach of contract more easily detected.  These types of 
bargains therefore serve as clear indicators of changes in governance structures, particularly at 
the state and market levels.  Notwithstanding the above, looking only at these formal bargains 
would be neglecting all the tacit and implicit bargains that exist in governance structures.  In 
both political and economic relationships there are conventions and understandings that existing 
outside of the formal frameworks, and are necessary for regulation and predictability in the 
system.  Albeit relative to formal agreements and codified bargains, behavioural patterns serve as 
the key indicator of tacit agreements but identifying the exact parameters to measure types of 
behaviour becomes difficult.  
 Although the key governing structures such as the state, market and civil authority are 
responsible for establishing the bargains within the system, the bargains also affect the 
environment of the structures themselves.  As noted earlier, Phillips suggests that bargains are a 
means to create real power in terms of enforcing certain behaviour where only the potential for 
power existed.  Therefore, the creation of new bargains can also create new responsibilities and 
roles within the structures.  As time passes new bargains are struck and the structures continue to 
adapt and evolve with the new realities they face.  However, Phillips also points to the 
importance of individual actors in the outcomes of bargains, “… the ebb and flow of bargains is 
not necessarily continuous.  By sheer force of personality, strong leaders can forge new bargains 
before the relevant structures have fully developed or can sustain failing bargains beyond their 
natural lifespan.  Alternatively, weak leaders can precipitate the destruction of some bargains 
that would otherwise survive for a time or fail to create new bargains despite supportive 
structures.”22  The importance of individuals in the network of bargains underlines the necessity 
of assessing structures and policy at multiple levels. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 Governance structures have shown significant change in the past few decades and will 
continue to change in the future.  These changes can be seen throughout many Western and 
Northern economies and Saskatchewan is no different.  Government and policy has changed 
since the Warman refinery debate and so too have the structures governing the uranium industry 
in the province.  Alternative theoretical framings such as economic theory, the “three Is” 
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(individuals, ideas, and institutions), new institutionalism, risk analysis or policy networks theory 
could also provide the analytical framework for the Saskatchewan uranium industry.  However, 
each of these tools narrows the scope of analysis in varying ways.  On the other hand, 
international political economy elicits broader analysis, allowing the researcher to view policy 
problems in a larger context.  International political economy provides many of the analytical 
tools necessary for identifying the underlying factors, precipitating changes in governance in 
Saskatchewan and for evaluating the outcomes.  Further, bridging IPE with policy analysis 
achieves closer inspection into the policy process, giving a more complete picture in government 
decision-making. Governance has moved beyond the state and now includes a variety of 
structures; IPE analysis helps illuminate the how these interconnected forces work together.  A 
better understanding of the uranium industry in Saskatchewan can be achieved by looking 
through these multiple lenses and identifying all the significant actors involved, the agreements 
they create, and the outcomes that result. These, in turn, give a more comprehensive picture of 
the Saskatchewan uranium story. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE URANIUM LIFE CYCLE AND SASKATCHEWAN 
3.1 Introduction  
 This chapter provides an overview of the history of uranium in the province of 
Saskatchewan, with particular attention to specific parts of the life cycle.  The uranium life cycle 
can be understood as the spectrum of stages uranium undergoes, beginning with prospecting, 
then mining, milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel production, power generation and ending with 
spent fuel storage.  Research, innovation and medical applications can also be included as stages 
of the uranium life cycle.  Although the areas of refining and nuclear power have been part of the 
discourse on uranium in Saskatchewan in the past fifty years, today the only major involvement 
the province has in the industry is with mining and milling.  This chapter introduces the policies 
and discussions in Saskatchewan pertaining to the spectrum of stages in the uranium cycle, 
including: (1) exploration and mining, (2) refining and upgrading, and (3) power generation and 
waste storage. 
 
       Figure 3.1 
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The section on exploration and mining lays out how uranium was initially discovered in 
Canada and how it expanded into mining and milling that supplied the nuclear weapons projects 
during World War II.  It illustrates how growth in uranium production in Canada allowed 
Saskatchewan to contribute to this production, it discusses the relationship between federal and 
provincial jurisdictions with respect to uranium production in light of security implications, an 
example of which is the establishment of Uranium City,  it explains how the surplus of uranium 
in the United States and Great Britain along with the policy of  only exporting uranium for 
peaceful purposes affected the Canadian uranium industry,  it explains how the global effects of 
energy demand led to the resurgence of the industry and to Saskatchewan establishing itself as a 
leading uranium producer,  and it discusses Saskatchewan‟s concerns over the current regulatory 
policy, a legacy of the Cold War years.  The section concludes with a discussion of the 
challenges within the existing policy framework and why they could hold back the province in 
the future and what changes could possibly negate this problem. 
 The section on refining and upgrading focuses on the period following the OPEC oil 
embargo and the first attempt the Saskatchewan government made at expanding the uranium 
cycle within the province.  It explains not only the factors that played into the revival of uranium 
both globally and in Saskatchewan, but also the policies at the federal and provincial levels in 
response to these factors. As well, it describes two specific attempts made by the provincial 
government to join the global initiative to venture into non-fossil fuel energy sources:  the heavy 
water facility and the uranium refinery. The uranium refinery will be covered in greater detail in 
chapter four. 
 The section on power generation and waste storage looks at the more recent ventures into 
the nuclear energy production stage.  It describes the actors involved in initiatives towards 
possible uranium cycle expansion and the policies these actors hoped to achieve.  As well, it 
examines why these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful and largely failed to take root, how 
the political climate has changed, and why the debates reopened at the end of the current decade.  
 In summary, this chapter illuminates the major events that had the greatest impact on the 
uranium industry in Saskatchewan.  Looking at past policy and the events that triggered change 
in policy and vice-versa, it aims to give an overview of how Saskatchewan has arrived at its 
current situation. 
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3.2 Exploration and Mining 
 The first major discovery of uranium in Canada occurred at Great Bear Lake in the 
Northwest Territories in 1930, a discovery that was staked by the Eldorado Gold Mining 
Company.
23
  Although little activity took place in the uranium industry throughout the rest of the 
decade, in 1942, the federal government decided to promote and to control uranium production 
due to the request from the governments of both the United Kingdom and the United States that 
Canada contribute to the nuclear weapons project.  The active pursuit of nuclear weapons by the 
United States became the primary driver for the first uranium mining in Canada.  And, since the 
Eldorado Gold Mining Company already had a mine, mill and a refinery – designed for radium 
production but that could be easily modified to produce uranium – Canada became an important 
partner.
24
  Consequently, 1942 marked the first uranium production in Canada at the Great Bear 
Lake deposit in the Northwest Territories.
25
    
 Canada‟s involvement in the United States nuclear weapons programme (the Manhattan 
Project)  made uranium a national security issue, giving the Canadian government little options 
in their initial handling of the resource. Consequently, all newly discovered uranium deposits 
were required to be exclusively under federal government control, banning all potential staking 
by private interests. The provincial governments implemented similar policies. Subsequently, in 
January 1944 the federal government assumed control of the assets of the Eldorado Gold Mining 
Company: it nationalized the Company, compensated the shareholders, and eventually created a 
Crown corporation renamed Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited. Notwithstanding this 
nationalization event, the management of the mines and refinery remained the same.  Because 
the foreign demand for additional uranium sources rose, the Geological Survey of Canada began 
to assist in the search of untapped uranium deposits
26
 and, in 1944, prospecting began in earnest 
in Saskatchewan at the Beaverlodge District, the site of an accidental find in the 1930s.  
 In 1946, the federal government continued to expand its control over the Canadian 
uranium industry by introducing the Atomic Energy Control Act and the Atomic Energy Control 
Board (AECB), a regulatory policy and a body to strengthen their control over the resource.  The 
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AECB and the Act deemed the uranium industry and all of its undertakings for the “general 
advantage” of Canada.  Thereafter, the federal government had constitutional jurisdiction over 
the regulation of uranium mining, a constitutional duty which previously belonged to the 
provinces.
27
  Despite these tighter regulations, and perhaps due to the federal intervention, the 
push of prospecting in northern Saskatchewan continued through the 1940s and into the 
beginning of the 1950s. 
Shortly after WWII, the international politics settled into a bipolar system with 
democratic states on one side and communist states on the other.  The rebuilding of Europe 
allowed the United States to emerge as the predominant power among Western democracies 
while the Soviet Union served as the standard-bearer for the Communist Bloc.  The nature of this 
international system forced states to choose a side and contribute to the on-going competition 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  For Canada, supplying uranium to the United 
States and Great Britain for the nuclear arms race represented its contribution and the next two 
decades influenced both the production and regulatory aspects of the national uranium industry. 
The creation of new towns to service the mines was one issue where the federal 
regulatory policy left the province in a difficult position.  The federal government was 
responsible for initiating the prospecting and mining in the region, however their policy did not 
address creating a local workforce and the necessary associated amenities. Before Uranium City 
was established one of the challenges for the early expansion of the uranium industry was 
securing a local labour force and this led to negotiations between the federal and provincial 
governments to find a solution.  Saskatchewan‟s CCF government presented two options: create 
a town for every mine or build a town to serve the entire region.
28
  A single town appeared to be 
the preferable option but neither the federal government nor the provincial government were 
prepared to cover the costs.  The development of the mine at Beaverlodge continued, however, 
and in 1951 Eldorado Mining began to build the facilities necessary to supply the mine sites.  
The federal Department of Transport also became involved by building an airstrip for the area 
and a port at Black Bay to avoid the portage between Lake Athabasca and Beaverlodge Lake.
29
  
Nevertheless, the lack of a planned town led to the emergence of multiple squatter communities, 
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a situation similar to that of Ontario‟s shanty towns around mines, a problem that Saskatchewan 
had hoped to avoid.  Consequently, the province and Eldorado Mining decided on a new town 
called Uranium City, modeled after the company town of Arvida, Quebec.  The provincial 
government was still reluctant to pay for the town and requested that the federal Crown, 
Eldorado Mining, pay for its construction, but that ownership of the town would remain with the 
provincial government.  This proposal was soundly rejected by Eldorado Mining and the 
Saskatchewan government had no choice but to pursue the endeavor itself.  In July 1952 the 
province began to survey a townsite which would become Uranium City, located in the 
northwest corner of Saskatchewan, roughly 725 kilometers northwest of Prince Albert.
30
  Before 
the completion of the townsite, Eldorado Mining began mining at the Beaverlodge Mine in 1953 
and six years later the Uranium City mining camp was finally established.
31
   
 Security risks remained one of the central reasons for the federal government to increase 
their level of control on the uranium industry.  The lawsuit Pronto Uranium Mines Ltd. v. 
Ontario Labour Relations Board et al supported this stance.  In 1956 the Ontario Supreme Court 
upheld a ruling that federal regulation still applied to uranium mining in accordance with the 
principles of “peace, order and good government.”32  The central reason for allowing federal 
regulation to stand in the case of uranium mining is the highly contentious debate over the safety 
of the resource both on-site and off-site.  All the provinces, including Saskatchewan, still had the 
responsibility of monitoring the day-to-day operations of the mines, but according to the 
regulations set at the national level.  This created a difficult situation for the Saskatchewan 
government; they became responsible for carrying out federal policy while meeting the socio-
economic challenges in the province.  Somewhat like the dispute over funding for Uranium City, 
the provincial government covered some of the costs of the federal mandate but had little control 
over policy.  This relationship began to alter, however, as uranium use and export policy 
changed.   
 Towards the end of the 1950s the importance of new uses for uranium and, in particular, 
the development of nuclear energy technology began to eclipse the military use of uranium.  In 
1958 the federal government indicated that future uranium exports would be for peaceful 
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purposes only.  This year also marked the beginning of the commercial uranium industry in 
Canada with private producers granted the ability to engage in their own marketing.
33
  The 
following year marked the peak of uranium production in Canada, exceeding every other metal 
or mineral that year.  But changes to the global uranium climate and uranium price decreases 
forced Saskatchewan to rethink its uranium strategy. 
 In 1959, the peak of Canadian uranium production, the United States began to decrease 
the foreign supply of uranium and by 1967 the delivery of foreign uranium to the United States 
ended completely.  Furthermore, in 1970 the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) of the United 
States announced that they had roughly 45 thousand kilograms of surplus stock uranium.   
Similarly, the UK Atomic Energy Agency, the second largest international uranium purchaser, 
announced that they also had been overstocked since 1961.
34
 The worldwide decrease in uranium 
purchases had an enormous impact on Canada where, in 1959, uranium represented the nation‟s 
fourth-largest commodity export at roughly six percent of the overall export value, more than 
any other mineral.  In 1959 23 different mines produced roughly 15 million kilograms of 
uranium valued at roughly C$300 million, but in 1967 only four mines produced less than 4 
million kilograms of uranium valued at roughly C$50 million.
35
 
 The change in uranium policy of the American and British governments required Canada 
to adapt to the new reality of uranium production.  In an attempt to simply maintain the uranium 
industry at its much reduced capacity, the Canadian government introduced the first national 
stockpiling programme which ran from 1963 to 1974.
36
  The uranium industry, though a shell of 
its former self, remained viable due to interest in energy production and interest spurred on by 
other global economic factors at the beginning of the 1970s.  Realizing that the surplus uranium 
supply in the United States and Britain would mean a long hiatus on Canadian uranium exports 
to these nations, in 1972 the federal government allowed two Crown corporations, Eldorado 
Nuclear (previously Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited) and Uranium Canada Ltd., to begin 
a process of arranging marketing agreements with non-U.S. uranium producers.
37
  The primary 
objective of the agreements was setting new parameters for things like establishing minimum 
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selling prices and creating regulation and predictability in previously unexplored uranium 
markets. 
 The new initiative of the Canadian federal government to find new uranium buyers was 
bolstered the following year by the OPEC oil embargo.  Oil importing nations soon looked to 
developing and expanding their nuclear power programmes as an alternative energy source to 
protect themselves from the current and potential future energy crises.  This was particularly 
prevalent with developed nations now heavily dependent on foreign oil.  The preliminary work 
done in 1972 by Eldorado Nuclear and Uranium Canada Ltd. to establish frameworks paid 
dividends when Canada began negotiating long-term sales agreements in 1973.  By 1974, a total 
of 38 million kilograms of Canadian uranium had been negotiated for foreign export, an amount 
roughly equal to ten times national annual production.
38
  Increased global demand reached such a 
high level in this period that the federal Minister of Energy instructed AECB to maintain the 
required minimum levels of uranium supply domestically in order to ensure the national nuclear 
energy programmes continued to function in both the short and long-term.  During this period 
Canada expanded its nuclear energy capabilities. And though Saskatchewan continued to be a 
primary uranium ore producer in Canada, it set its sights on taking advantage of the boom in the 
uranium industry. 
 Canada and Saskatchewan were both interested in expanding existing and developing 
new nuclear power infrastructure.  Ontario already refined uranium and produced nuclear energy 
in the 1970s while the Saskatchewan government only began to seriously look at uranium 
expansion during this decade.  The matter of cycle expansion in Saskatchewan, discussed in the 
following section, was at least partly influenced by the regulatory protocol.  
 As described earlier in this section, the initial regulatory framework for uranium mining 
was based on export for weapons manufacturing.  Although the federal policy on exports 
changed in the following decades, much of the domestic framework at the beginning of the 
1970s remained based on the federal policies of supplying uranium for weapons manufacturing.  
The federal government, in cooperation with the provincial government, was interested in 
exploring and mining in a cost-effective manner; however, this was often undertaken without any 
meaningful socio-economic analysis of affected regions.  The Uranium City mining community 
is an example of the reluctance of the federal government to become involved in socio-
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economics and of the inability of the provincial government to gain federal funding in order to 
meet the needs of local communities. This changed as foreign need for uranium exports dried up 
and the Canadian government exited the weapons manufacturing, thus allowing the provincial 
government to become more involved in the regulatory process.  
 During the early years of uranium mining development in Saskatchewan the federal 
government held responsibility for ensuring that the ecological and health impacts were looked 
after and that the mines met necessary criteria to ensure public safety.  Because the regulatory 
body, the AECB, was located in Ottawa apprehension arose that many of the socio-economic 
concerns would continue to be overlooked.  The Saskatchewan government wanted to prevent 
the lack of planning that occurred in the past from continuing in the future.  This meant 
reevaluating regulation in order to give more attention to concerns for the existing and new 
communities affected by uranium mining.  As Parsons and Barsi describe, “limited attention was 
paid to workers‟ occupational health and safety, less to environmental protection, and no 
attention at all to reclamation, communities, or socioeconomic performance,” during the Lake 
Athabasca development.
39
  The provincial government, wanting to protect itself against similar 
scenarios playing out with new mine developments, became more involved in the process.   
 As the provincial government placed greater emphasis on these types of issues, public 
participation increased and public hearings were introduced to allow communities to express 
their thoughts and opinions on the development of uranium mines.  Parsons and Barsi point out 
five major public hearings on mining in northern Saskatchewan: the Berger Inquiry into the 
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline in the Northwest Territories (1974-1978); the Bayda Commission 
Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry (1977-1978); the Key Lake Board of Inquiry (1979); the Rabbit 
Lake Panel (1993-1994); and the Joint Federal Provincial Panel of Uranium Mining 
Developments in Northern Saskatchewan (1991-1997).
40
  These types of public hearings and 
inquiries allowed for more open debate on many of the socio-economic issues that had 
previously been ignored.  The resulting changes in regulation not only improved the conditions 
for mines and adjacent communities, but also aided the provincial government in creating better 
opportunities for the northern region of the province.  This was part of their goal to create greater 
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parity between the south and the north, a goal that also aimed for through expansion into value-
added ventures. 
3.3 Refining and Upgrading 
 This section focuses on government policy in light of the shift in uranium use that began 
during the late 1950s.  It explains how the reduction of weapons stockpiling in concert with a 
greater emphasis on energy security expanded the use of uranium from the narrow approach in 
the nuclear weapons industry during the 40s and 50s.   It discusses how Western governments 
began to embrace nuclear energy as an alternative to fossil fuels, how this allowed the Canadian 
uranium mining industry to mature and how it gave Saskatchewan the opportunity to expand on 
their capacity in uranium processing. 
 The value of uranium has not been insulated from the effects of the global market; rather 
it has been subject to the booms and busts experienced by most natural resources.  However, due 
to its limited number of uses the value of uranium is much more sensitive than other minerals.  
For the first half of the twentieth century its demand was based exclusively on its use in weapons 
manufacturing, forcing the Canadian and Saskatchewan uranium industries to rely heavily on the 
American and British nuclear weapons programmes.  The strength of the uranium industry began 
to ebb in the 1960s when much of the uranium used at the early stages of weapons development 
was recycled, and the need for newly mined uranium decreased.  In addition to the recycling of 
uranium, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union could not maintain its 
break-neck pace, especially with a backlash from the general public against the threat of global 
nuclear war. 
 In 1959 Canadian uranium production hit its peak of 14.4 million kilograms from 23 
different mines, valued at C$300 million.  At the time uranium represented Canada‟s fourth 
largest exported commodity, close to six percent of the overall export value.  However, by 1967 
only four mines remained open with production around 3.6 million kilograms, valued at C$50 
million.
41
  As the price of uranium plummeted in the 1960s so, too, did government initiatives 
and programmes associated with the mineral, and the only option available for the Canadian 
government to keep uranium mining afloat was stockpiling programmes, one in 1963 and a 
second in 1965.   
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 While uranium prices fell, oil prices remained steady in the 1960s despite the creation of 
OPEC. Only in the 1970s did that organization begin to exercise its command of oil supply. The 
climax came in 1973 when OPEC placed an embargo on oil in response to the United States 
support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War.  Following this event and recognizing the 
capability of other states to determine essential commodity prices the focus of many nations 
turned to methods of ensuring energy security.  New state policy in France moved quickly to 
integrate nuclear power generation into its national power infrastructure and today generates 
almost all of its electricity this way.  The United States, Great Britain, and Germany also looked 
to nuclear power generation as a viable and valuable option, moving forward and building 
nuclear power plants, but not to same scale as France.  As a competitive source of energy, oil 
proved to be one of the key factors in igniting the rise of the commercial value of uranium.  
Already established as a primary producer of the raw material, Saskatchewan became motivated 
to expand its uranium capabilities. 
 The 1970s were a particularly important era for uranium politics in Saskatchewan.  The 
provincial government policy began to shift in favor of developing the uranium industry which 
meant an expansion of the capacity within the province, both in terms of increased mining 
operations and growth of facilities for extending the life cycle in Saskatchewan.  This shift also 
included talks on a heavy water facility and a uranium refinery.  In February 1973, the 
Saskatchewan government began to encourage Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) to 
select Estevan as the site for a heavy-water facility.
42
  The plant would have produced 800 tons 
of heavy-water annually and employed roughly 150 to 200 people.  One drawback of the Estevan 
location was the lack of water supply from the Souris River but the province recognized this 
problem and was prepared to divert the South Saskatchewan River.  The province also promised 
to cover $12 million of the $33 million capital cost of the plant as well as the annual operating 
costs of $300 000.
43
  In addition, the diversion of the South Saskatchewan River would serve the 
purposes of increasing the water supply to Regina, Weyburn, and to the Saskatchewan Power 
Corporation Boundary Dam, and increasing water supply for irrigation and livestock watering in 
the south-east.  These concomitant purposes with the heavy water plant more easily justified 
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public expenditure for the project.
44
  Despite piecing together an attractive offer, Saskatchewan 
failed to win the contract, and AECL decided to select Quebec as the site for the heavy-water 
facility.  Notwithstanding falling short in the push to get the plant in Estevan, the provincial 
government remained persistent in its efforts to secure expansion on uranium-related ventures.  
The next major item on the agenda for the Blakeney government was the uranium refinery. 
 The following gives a brief overview of the central issues concerning the refinery during 
the 1970s.  Because the global strength of uranium persisted during this period the Saskatchewan 
government continued to be motivated to develop additional capabilities for the mineral within 
the province.  It proposed constructing a uranium refinery in the province shortly after the failure 
to secure the heavy-water plant.  In addition, in June 1974 it created the Saskatchewan Mining 
Development Corporation (SMDC), a Crown corporation, to actively pursue any possibilities for 
expansion of the uranium industry.  This government initiative of the Blakeney government 
stimulated corporations such as Eldorado Nuclear to begin to investigate the viability of 
constructing value-added facilities in the province.  An independent feasibility study, initiated by 
the provincial government, concluded that building a uranium refinery in Saskatchewan was 
viable.  Soon the province entered discussions with Eldorado Nuclear on the prospects of 
constructing a uranium refinery.
45
 
 Eldorado Nuclear‟s assessment of potential sites for the uranium refinery concluded that 
the Warman area was the most desirable location.  This triggered SMDC to broker deals with 
local farms to secure the necessary land on behalf of Eldorado Nuclear.  As the plans of the 
provincial government and Eldorado Nuclear began to materialize, public awareness increased 
and public opposition to the uranium refinery emerged.  Hence, the provincial government found 
itself in the difficult position of appeasing the voting public while at the same time ensuring 
future corporate investments.  Efforts made to convince Eldorado Nuclear to prolong the 
assessment period while the NDP government attempted to turn public opinion in their favour 
proved unsuccessful.   As the anti-nuclear voice grew stronger, Eldorado Nuclear‟s interest in 
Saskatchewan as a potential site waned.  The provincial government soon relented: it became 
clear that pushing forward the refinery agenda would be monumentally difficult.  These events 
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ended the proposals for uranium expansion with the Blakeney government.  The events of the 
uranium refinery will be discussed at greater length in chapter four. 
3.4 Nuclear Energy and Waste Storage 
 In the early 1990s there was some consideration within the province to reengage with 
nuclear development.  One of the key actors in this new proposition was Atomic Energy of 
Canada (AECL) which devised plans with the Devine government.  A proposal was developed to 
build a nuclear reactor large enough to supply Saskatchewan.  However, these talks failed in 
creating any type of real policy for nuclear power generation in Saskatchewan and the idea died 
with the change in governments in March 1992.  However, in December 1992, the new NDP 
government in Saskatchewan and AECL signed a new memorandum of understanding to 
investigate the option of a nuclear power plant in Saskatchewan; however the MOU stated the 
government made no pre-commitment to purchase a CANDU-3.
46
  In 1999, Chief Ray 
Ahenakew and the Meadow Lake Tribal Council also began talks about nuclear energy and 
waste storage in Saskatchewan but again nothing concrete developed.  Now the possibility of 
nuclear power is again being opened by the provincial government. 
 Part of the party platform the Saskatchewan Party ran on in the 2007 election was the 
necessity to reopen the discussion of uranium value-added opportunities and the creation of a 
nuclear energy programmes.  After the election the Saskatchewan Party government continued to 
support this stance on nuclear power and in October 2008 created an advisory panel designed to 
aid the government in the development of the nuclear industry.  The Uranium Development 
Partnership included leaders of companies with vested interests in Saskatchewan's uranium, 
including: Jerry Grandey, the president and CEO of Cameco Corp.; Armand Laferrere, president 
and CEO of Areva Canada; and Duncan Hawthorne, president and CEO of Bruce Power Inc.  
The group also included individuals from the First Nations community, urban and rural 
municipalities, and nuclear physicists and researchers.  Tasked with evaluating the current state 
of the Saskatchewan uranium industry, the panel conducted its own feasibility study into 
building a nuclear power plant in the province and made the recommendation that nuclear energy 
was the most viable option.
 47
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 After the panel delivered its findings, the provincial government went to work in securing 
potential partners in the construction of a nuclear reactor.  The province entered discussions with 
corporations already involved in the nuclear energy sector, such as Bruce Power, but many of 
these plans remained tentative until the public consultation process had been completed.  During 
the summer of 2009 a series of public hearings were held throughout the province to gauge 
public perception on the matter of a nuclear reactor.  From these hearings the provincial 
government hoped to derive a better sense of the public attitude toward this type of uranium 
expansion in the province and whether pursuing this avenue was safe politically.  However, 
around the same time as the public consultations the isotope reactor in Chalk River, Ontario, 
went offline due to emergency maintenance.  The Saskatchewan government then used this 
opportunity to submit a proposal to be the site for a new isotope facility.  The question facing 
Saskatchewan in 2010 is whether nuclear energy will finally be pursued and whether the 
political, economic and social climate is conducive to development. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
1970-1985: WARMAN URANIUM REFINERY 
4.1 Introduction 
 The end of the 1950s marked the end of an era in the Canadian uranium industry.  No 
longer was the resource exported for military use after the introduction in 1958 of the federal 
policy stipulating export for peaceful purposes only.  The federal government initiated the 
stockpiling of uranium to counteract the forces of the global market in order to sustain the 
Canadian uranium industry because uranium use began to decease internationally throughout the 
1960s.  Soon Saskatchewan and the rest of Canada created a supply of uranium that far exceeded 
its demand.  At the beginning of the 1970s, however, uranium had a turn in fortune due to global 
events and the subsequent perceived need for energy security.  The Saskatchewan government 
realized that the need for energy security increased the value of uranium and made the expansion 
of the uranium cycle within the province an attractive venture.  This marked the beginning of the 
energy production era.  This chapter covers: (1) the structures of the uranium industry during the 
Blakeney years, (2) the new provincial policy that encouraged growth in the uranium industry, 
and (3) the processes that took place during the efforts to build a refinery at Warman and the 
outcomes of these processes.  Discussion of these three areas illuminates the key policies created 
by the participants in the refinery process, thus providing a better understanding on the nature of 
uranium politics during this era and the possible outcomes of similar politics in the future. 
4.2 Power Structures in the Blakeney Uranium Era 
Power structures, as described by Strange, encompass four areas of the overall system: 
security, production, finance and knowledge.  The four structures work in conjunction and open 
the opportunity for new bargains to form.  Looking at the four structures in the Saskatchewan 
uranium industry during the 1970s and 1980s, one can see critical governance roles held by the 
state both external and internal to the province.  In the case of the refinery process in 
Saskatchewan, the external structures and bargains created conditions which opened the 
possibility to engage in the process of pursuing a uranium refinery. 
In the broadest sense, a bipolar security structure emerged prior to the 1970s and 
continued during the refinery debate.  The bipolar system allowed the uranium industry to 
flourish while producing weapons but at the same time forced governments to implement strict 
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regulations on uranium.  In Canada, the federal government held responsibility for creating the 
regulations.  Therefore, the construction of a uranium refinery relied on federal approval due to 
the security structure at the time. 
The production structures during this era remained heavily influence by the security 
structures.  Not only did the Canadian government hold responsibility for creating regulation, 
Crown corporations served as the primary uranium mining operators in Saskatchewan.  Foreign 
producers, however, played a key role in revitalizing the uranium industry.  The oil embargo 
created by OPEC, another state organization, forced many governments to rethink their energy 
programmes, thus allowing the Saskatchewan government and federal Crowns to focus on 
expanding uranium capacity in response.   
The financial structures in the uranium industry during the 1970s and 1980s also fell 
primarily under state control.  The provincial government created the Saskatchewan Mining and 
Development Corporation and gave it responsibility to manage all uranium mining operations 
within Saskatchewan.  These responsibilities included arranging domestic and international 
partnerships which resulted in an increase in uranium mining and the opportunity for a uranium 
refinery. 
The knowledge structures during this era primarily included the ability to extract and 
process uranium, generate nuclear power, and establish regulations and security.  For 
Saskatchewan and Canada the majority of these structures rested in state control, particularly 
regulation and research.  The level of control wielded by the state, a symptom of the Cold War, 
ensured that any new development required cooperation and open lines of communication 
between two levels of government and in concert with the North American security policy. 
The four structures help map the variety of actors involved in the uranium industry, 
specifically either those creating the conditions that allow expansion or those attempting to 
facilitate expansion.  How well the actors within the structures worked together and the bargains 
they created are central to understanding the policy process during this era. 
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Table 4.1 
Structures in the 1970s-80s Saskatchewan Uranium Industry 
Security Production Finance Knowledge 
Bipolar system 
required strict state 
(provincial and 
federal) oversight 
and regulatory 
policy 
Provincial 
government held 
primary control over 
the means of 
production but 
foreign 
organizations 
(OPEC) dictated 
energy prices 
State control 
(SMDC) over credit 
and investment in 
existing and new 
uranium ventures 
Security and 
production primary 
knowledge bases in 
the uranium 
industry, under 
government control 
 
However, the process evoked change in the dynamic between state, market and society, 
marking the beginning of a shift in governance in the uranium industry.  At the beginning and 
throughout the process, the state held the dominant role in all four structures.  Market and 
societal actors held little to no influence over the decision-making process, but the refinery 
process forced policy-makers to re-evaluate the importance of actors outside the state.     
Figure 4.1 
 
The lack of collaboration between a variety of actors led to a policy process similar to the 
streams model described earlier and focusing on a specific project meant the construction of the 
refinery relied on a number of variables to fit through a “policy window.”  Therefore, the success 
of the refinery and the provincial government relied on perfect conditions that may not have been 
possible during this era due to the governance model in place. 
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4.3 New Provincial Uranium Policy 
 The 1970s were a particularly important era for uranium politics in Saskatchewan.  The 
provincial government policy began to shift in favor of developing the uranium industry through 
an expansion of the capacity within the province, both in terms of increased mining operations 
and growth in facilities for the whole life cycle.   
 The provincial government focused initially on the need for a revised mineral policy, a 
policy response to the recent global events.  The Saskatchewan government wanted to ensure 
that the province‟s uranium industry continued to grow and that the province benefitted from 
growth.  The Blakeney government wanted to ensure that Saskatchewan determined its own 
economic future.  The result, a new mineral policy developed in 1974, contained four central 
objectives: 
1) The province, as the owner of mineral resources, should receive a return from the 
development and use of these resources which adequately compensates the province 
for the depletion of its non-renewable resources and which ensures that the economic 
rent accruing to mineral resources is returned to the province. 
2) Private firms which are now engaged in developing resources or which may become 
engaged in resource activity in the future, should be allowed to receive a fair return 
on their investment which is commensurate with the risk involved. 
3) To be consistent with general economic development policy, mineral resource 
development should strive to ensure that the secondary benefits of resource extraction 
are retained in Saskatchewan to the greatest extent possible, by developing processing 
and other related facilities in the province to enhance employment opportunities and 
to retain the value added component of mineral development in Saskatchewan. 
4) The rate of exploration, development and other related activities should be 
determined on the basis of market demand, security of supply, long term provincial 
requirements relative to the adequacy of supplies and the need for regional economic 
development.
48
 
Although the new policy presented broad objectives, it lacked specifics on how to execute this 
plan for the future.  Nevertheless, the intent remained clear – the province wanted to take 
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advantage of the window of opportunity presented due to events at the global stage, specifically 
the OPEC oil embargo.  While the Saskatchewan government was concerned with increasing the 
amount of interest from the private sector, they remained adamant that private corporations 
remain coordinated with government.  As well, much of this cooperation should take the form of 
joint-ventures.   The path set by the new policy indicated that the Saskatchewan government 
wanted to become more involved in the workings of the uranium industry.  However, this would 
require additional capacity at the corporate level and in this case a new Crown corporation.  
Nevertheless, it would be specific events that spurred the creation of a new Crown. 
 Saskatchewan‟s first attempt to expand its uranium capacity occurred in February 1973; 
the provincial government tried to win the bid for a heavy-water facility.  AECL required a new 
Canadian facility and Saskatchewan made considerable efforts to be the recipient of the heavy-
water plant, but in the end was unsuccessful. The contract was awarded to Quebec.  Recognizing 
that uranium could play a large role in the future, the provincial government created the 
Saskatchewan Mining and Development Corporation (SMDC) in June 1974, signaling a new 
policy aimed at taking advantage of the uranium renaissance of the 1970s.  SMDC enabled 
Saskatchewan to have greater control over its resources, specifically uranium.  With international 
interest booming and many American and European-based corporations looking at expansion in 
Saskatchewan, the provincial government needed to establish itself as a player in the uranium 
market.   
 Prior to the formation of SMDC, Eldorado Nuclear and the federal government handled 
most of the international uranium dealings.  The key event, however, the one that precipitated the 
creation of SMDC, was the interest that the West German corporation Uranerz had in expanding 
its operation into Saskatchewan.  It wanted to establish a joint venture comprised of itself and the 
province with the possibility of other actors.  Its proposal largely rested on its desire to comply 
with pending federal regulation that restricted foreign ownership of mines to thirty-three 
percent.
49
  As well, its proposal would open new lines of communication between private, 
international mining corporations and the province.  Shortly thereafter, the province established 
SMDC and entered into a joint venture with Uranerz to develop what would eventually become 
the Key Lake uranium mine.  Although the new provincial minerals policy encompassed the 
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overall vision for the future of Saskatchewan, SMDC narrowed the scope of the new vision and 
in its first years pursued five objectives: 
1) Develop the mineral resources of Northern Saskatchewan. 
2) Make a profit. 
3) Retain for the Crown control of all mineral dispositions in Northern Saskatchewan. 
4) Socio-economic development of Northern Saskatchewan by bringing about greater 
involvement of local people in the mineral industry. 
5) Regain control of mineral dispositions now owned in the private sector, e.g. Gulf 
Mine at Rabbit Lake, Mokta deposit at Cluff Lake.
50
 
By adhering to these goals, SMDC sought to give the province greater control in the prospecting 
and mining processes.  It allowed the province to pursue the foreign investment required to 
develop the mining industry, while at the same time allocating the profits made in these joint 
ventures to the critical policy goal of building infrastructure in the north.   
 After reassessing the objectives of SMDC, Jack Messer, the minister of natural resources, 
reiterated that the Crown, indeed, intended to operate first and foremost like a private 
corporation.  In January 1977, he made the recommendation to Cabinet that SMDC, “…should 
be regarded primarily as a profit-oriented organization, and should be expected to operate similar 
to a private sector company, subject to two modifications.”51  The first modification emphasized 
northern development in the province; the second required SMDC to serve as a model 
corporation, again with particular focus on relations with the north.  These modifications 
required SMDC to pursue ventures and train individuals at a cost, and subsequently reduced 
profit, a situation that may not be acceptable in the private sector.  Thus, creating a Crown 
designed to operate partly as a private corporation allowed Saskatchewan to develop its uranium 
mining industry.  However, the efforts did not end just with the growth in mining; its focus 
shifted to plans for a uranium refinery. 
 Building a uranium refinery became an important policy for the Blakeney government in 
the 1970s after the significant rise in the price of uranium.  The dramatic rise in prices followed a 
period in which the price of uranium dropped due to the reduction of military requirements.  In 
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the late 1960s to the early 1970s many uranium producers could not survive with the depressed 
demand, as few firms could cover costs or obtain a sufficient return on their invested capital.  As 
a result, many firms with weak financial structures unable to cope with the extended low price, 
uncertain of the future of the industry, dropped out of uranium production.
52
  However, the major 
uranium producer, Eldorado Nuclear, continued to operate, and, as uranium prices began to turn, 
the province took the opportunity to expand its existing capacity. 
4.4 The Warman Uranium Refinery Proposal 
 The Warman uranium refinery case in Saskatchewan is one of the critical events that has 
defined uranium policy in the province.  The potential for completing the uranium life cycle 
within the province has continually emerged in debate among policy-makers, the private sector 
and the general public.  This debate among private and public stakeholders was once again at the 
forefront and a major contributor to policy decision making and for the future of uranium in the 
province.  The mining of uranium has been an industry in the province since the 1930s, gaining 
prominence first in the era of nuclear weapons and then again with the rise of nuclear power 
generation, but value-added initiatives have been unsuccessful in Saskatchewan.   
 During the 1970s the province saw an increase in uranium mining activity: the 
construction of the mine-mill complex at Rabbit Lake was very close to completion, discussions 
between the province and Amok Ltd. regarding a mine at Cluff Lake were progressing, and 
discussions were taking place with Uranerz of Canada Ltd. regarding additional exploration in 
the province‟s north.  In light of the provincial government‟s new policy to create growth in the 
uranium sector, including the construction of new mines, corporations such as Eldorado Nuclear 
began to have a different perspective of Saskatchewan.  Subsequently, Saskatchewan, along with 
Ontario, became frontrunners as the location for a new uranium refinery.  The provincial 
government, eager to find some avenue of expansion quickly, commissioned a feasibility study 
for establishing a uranium refinery in Saskatchewan.  The May 1975 report from this study 
concluded that building a refinery in Saskatchewan was not only viable but also desirable.
53
  
Consequently, the provincial government entered talks with Eldorado Nuclear to investigate the 
prospect of constructing and operating a uranium refinery.   
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 Since Eldorado Nuclear had already expressed  an interest in constructing a $15 million 
refinery which would employ roughly 30-40 people,  a consortium that consisted of the Atomic 
Energy Control Board (AECB, now the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission), Eldorado 
Nuclear, Environment Canada and Saskatchewan Environment was formed to guide the refinery 
project though a three-phase review process:
54
 phase 1, a preliminary assessment of the eleven 
potential sites (completed during the fall of 1975); phase 2, pairing potential  sites  down to four;  
and phase 3, a full-scale environmental impact assessment of the most ideal site followed by 
public hearings before a federal-provincial board.
55
  Despite agreement on the process at the 
beginning, at the end of the assessment the provincial government held the view that Eldorado 
Nuclear did not carry out the full review but instead selected one potential site for the refinery 
one month after agreeing to the three-phase plan in November 1975.  Eldorado Nuclear, 
however, believed it fulfilled its obligations.
56
 
 Once Eldorado Nuclear had formally announced its plans to assess the possibility of 
constructing a uranium refinery in Saskatchewan in February 1976, the provincially-owned 
Saskatchewan Economic Development Corporation (SEDCO) began to negotiate land options 
for an unspecified industrial development with farmers in the Warman area on Eldorado 
Nuclear‟s behalf.57  A lack of transparency in these negotiations became evident, and soon after 
Eldorado Nuclear confirmed itself as the client for which SEDCO had engaged in negotiations.
58
  
The failure of the provincial government and Eldorado Nuclear to remain transparent and clear 
on their intent with the public in these negotiations became one of the critical incidents which 
fueled public opposition to the uranium refinery.  And it soon became clear that neither the 
provincial government nor Eldorado Nuclear anticipated the organized opposition they would 
face.   
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 The Minister of Environment at the time, Neil Byers, acknowledged on August 6, 1976, a 
high level of interest in the uranium refinery project and defended the position of the government 
and their cooperation with Eldorado Nuclear to begin uranium refining in the province, a 
particularly important response to the public given the recent secrecy with regard to the 
negotiations for the land in the Warman area.  This defense of the uranium refinery project was 
also necessary in light of the increase in public inquiry into the Warman proposal.  Byers 
empathized with the public concern and guaranteed that a public consultation would be a 
component of the process moving forward.
59
  Although, Eldorado Nuclear continued to move 
forward in their quest for land acquisition for the construction of a refinery, Byers also made it 
clear that government support for the project was contingent on the refinery being consistent 
with the goals of its resource development policy.  He described the policy in three broad 
objectives: (1) to maximize per capita income and job opportunities and to achieve a more 
uniform distribution of jobs and incomes across the province; (2) to have raw materials mined in 
Saskatchewan processed in the province by Saskatchewan people; and (3) to ensure that no 
development of resources would take place until the government was satisfied that health and 
safety of people and environmental effects were fully assured.
60
  Of these three objectives the 
first two were an easier sell.  Explaining that one outcome of the refinery was the creation of jobs 
and capital within the province was a simple message that would be easy to convey to the public.  
However, since the methods of implementing the third objective were undefined at the time 
Byers made the statement, they would continue to be a sticking point moving forward.   
 The third  objective, satisfying health and safety concerns, also remained a contentious 
issue within the NDP government: some elected officials believed that refined uranium could be 
used in nuclear weapons and, hence, they were faced with a moral dilemma in accepting or 
rejecting the uranium refinery project.  This type of sentiment was understandable given that just 
two decades earlier Saskatchewan was responsible for supplying foreign nuclear weapons 
programmes.  Again Byers rebutted this criticism of building a uranium refinery in the province.  
He pointed out that if, indeed, there existed a moral fault in producing refined uranium within the 
province due to the connection to nuclear weapons, then logically, since yellowcake could be 
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refined anywhere else, uranium mining itself in the province should cease.
61
  He also expressed 
to his colleagues that a failure to expand the capacity of uranium production in Saskatchewan 
could potentially mean a loss of future uranium expansion to provinces such as Ontario. 
 In the following months, although the province focused on the Amok Ltd. proposal for a 
mine-mill at Cluff Lake, the Saskatchewan government remained highly interested in the 
expansion of the uranium industry, in particular, the construction of a uranium refinery.  
However, one problem that they identified regarding the expansion process was the reluctance of 
Eldorado Nuclear to explore other sites for the refinery.  So, in January 1977, Saskatchewan 
Environment developed a list of arguments pertaining to the disadvantages of a single site 
assessment, as opposed to multiple site assessments; these disadvantages were aimed in 
particular to the selection of the Warman site. They argued that the Warman site was not well 
suited to promote new growth within the province because of its proximity to a major center, 
Saskatoon, especially since selection of that site was contrary to the goal of the government: 
decentralizing industry through the development of rural regions, and particularly the north.  As 
well as creating problems for provincial policy, the Warman site contained a pacifist Mennonite 
community which opposed uranium refining in principle.  On the other hand it benefitted 
Eldorado Nuclear to undertake an environmental impact assessment at alternative sites for two 
reasons:  first, the local support for the uranium refinery would possibly become more vocal if 
another site became a possibility; second, assessing alternative sites would still allow Eldorado 
Nuclear to construct a uranium refinery even if the Warman site were to be rejected by the 
review panel and the provincial government.
62
  The Saskatchewan government wanted to craft a 
scenario that led to expansion in the uranium industry.  Unfortunately for the Blakeney 
government, Eldorado Nuclear, in responding to the suggestion of a second environmental 
impact assessment, pointed out that the marginal viability of the Warman site itself and the cost 
of even a second assessment, roughly $500 000, would terminate the entire project.
63
  Thus, the 
government was left with the choice of either allowing or rejecting continuation of the refinery 
project. 
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 Eldorado Nuclear‟s beginning of phase 3 of their assessment of the Warman site in 
March 1977, without conducting any phase 2 assessments at any alternative sites, as they had 
previously agreed to, put pressure on the provincial government to support the process. In turn, 
the Ministry of Environment put pressure  on Eldorado Nuclear to show some interest in 
alternative sites in order to appear committed to following the agreed upon phases.  By Eldorado 
Nuclear doing so, the ministry expected more political support for the refinery, particularly from 
the business community in Saskatoon.  Consequently, the Ministry of Environment and the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce tried to convince Eldorado Nuclear to at least make a 
statement with regard to the examination of alternative construction sites.  However, Eldorado 
Nuclear remained reluctant to do so when such a statement would not be true.
64
  From 1977 to 
1979 the province continued to pressure Eldorado Nuclear either to conduct an assessment of one 
or more alternative sites, or at least to make a public statement implying the intent of additional 
assessments. These attempts fell on deaf ears as Eldorado Nuclear maintained its position that 
conducting additional assessments would be of no benefit given the cost, and any such statement 
could only be made if the assessment of additional sites were truly undertaken in earnest.   
 To put more pressure on Eldorado Nuclear, in April 1980, the new Environment Minister, 
Ted Bowerman, opened the debate to the public by stating to the Leader Post that the provincial 
government‟s concern lay with Eldorado Nuclear‟s reluctance to conduct studies on alternative 
sites.
65
  In February of 1979, the provincial government offered the idea of using Prince Albert as 
a potential alternative site.  Eldorado Nuclear responded soon after, stating that if they looked 
into Prince Albert as a site a necessary consequence would be dropping Warman as a possibility 
because they were only interested in examining one site at a time.  In addition, they pointed out 
the Prince Albert location would increase the costs of the project, including at least an additional 
$5 million for construction.  More importantly, Eldorado Nuclear worried that hinting toward a 
change in location would undo much of the efforts made in securing support from the Warman 
Town Council and the Rural Municipality of Corman Park.
66
  Evidence of this support was found 
in the brief presented by the Warman Town Council to the Environment Assessment Panel in 
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January 1980.   The report offered the following rationale for potential economic growth: 
temporary construction jobs for the project, permanent careers in the local area, promotion for 
other commercial and industrial development, and increase in the tax base.   The town council 
rationale for creating a stronger economic cycle fell in line with the Bayda Inquiry.  That inquiry 
recommended development of the Saskatchewan uranium industry, stipulating new jobs went to 
northern and rural residents.  The town council agreed with the recommendation, stating, “we 
feel that the yellowcake should be refined in Saskatchewan rather than export it to Ontario to be 
refined at the Port Hope Refinery.”67  In the end, on July 16, 1979, Eldorado Nuclear made it 
clear that Warman remained the possible site from both an environmental and economic 
standpoint.  And nine days later, on July 25, 1979, it released an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) which triggered a federal public inquiry.
68
  Due to the disagreement between 
Eldorado Nuclear and the Blakeney government, the province did not approve of proceeding 
with the inquiry. 
 Eldorado Nuclear‟s EIS gave it‟s rationale for the selection of the Warman site and 
proposed a $100 million uranium hexafluoride (UF6) refinery in Saskatchewan.  The 
construction of this refinery would be consistent with the provincial policy of ensuring that 
Saskatchewan uranium would be refined to the highest degree possible thus expanding the 
industry in the province.  The rationale argued that the first two phases of their assessment gave 
clear evidence that Warman was the only viable site in the province.  In phase I, an engineering 
and environmental study by Cambrian Engineering and the Saskatchewan Research Council 
reduced the number of potential sites from fourteen to two: Vanscoy and Warman.  In phase II, 
the study of the two sites included water analysis, dye studies of river flow characteristics, air 
photo analysis and extensive literature reviews.  The phase I report, “Saskatchewan Site 
Evaluation Study for Eldorado Nuclear Limited, Uranium Refinery,” was completed in July 
1976; the phase II report, in July 1977.   In phase III, Beak Consultants Limited conducted a two-
year environmental impact study, the results of which became a major part of the EIS.  
 Although this part of the EIS covered many of the important technical details of the 
proposed uranium refinery, including uranium input and output, water usage and waste, the 
                                                 
67
 The Council of The Town of Warman, “Uranium Refinery Brief,” Presented to the Environment Assessment 
Panel concerning the proposed Uranium Refinery by Eldorado Nuclear Limited, near Warman, Saskatchewan, 
January 1980. 
68
 Dakers to Beatty (July 16 1979), “Uranium Production and Royalties, Saskatchewan,” Allan Blakeney Papers, 
1984 V 453, 1. 
43 
 
socio-economic effects of the refinery for the local communities held much more importance.  
The report emphasized that the refinery would offer several benefits to the local communities 
while the costs would remain minor.  Employment for the nearby communities remained a key 
issue for accepting the proposal and the Eldorado Nuclear report states that “the local 
communities of Warman, Martensville, Dalmeny, and Osler may supply up to one third of the 
construction labour force and one third of the operations personnel.”69  Most of the operating 
personnel, unsurprisingly, would be drawn from Saskatoon and area except for fifteen to thirty 
specialists transferred from existing Eldorado Nuclear operations.  Using local personnel would 
create little additional strain on the community services, a socio-economic factor problematic to 
many resource industries, and this made the refinery an attractive addition to the local 
communities that desired controlled growth.  The construction stage would create the largest 
income for the region with a potential $26 million spent on goods and services – as many as 393 
jobs would be created with an estimated payroll of $9.5 million.
70
   After construction, the 
refinery would employ 220 permanently with an annual income between $3.5 and $4.0 million.  
The EIS, therefore, gave technical support to a refinery that would also boost the local economy 
and add strength and diversity to Saskatchewan industry, both primary initiatives in provincial 
policy.   
 A federal inquiry began shortly after the release of Eldorado Nuclear‟s Environmental 
Impact Statement. Environment Canada created a seven member panel from the Federal 
Environmental Assessment Review Office charged with the task of looking at the environmental 
and social impacts of the Warman refinery.  They began their investigation on October 17, 1979.   
 The public hearings held between the 8
th
 and 24
th
 of January 1980 in Saskatoon and 
Martensville attracted groups and individuals associated with the anti-uranium (nuclear) 
movement.  This movement existed before the uranium refinery proposal was submitted and the 
proposal offered an opportunity for the group to mobilize and gain additional support.  In 
addition, the federal public inquiry represented an ideal venue for the anti-uranium advocates to 
express their agenda – preventing the construction of a uranium refinery in the province.   
 At the hearings, various anti-nuclear groups focused on questioning the ecological and 
sociological impacts of the refinery: local residents and farmers voiced particular concern on the 
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potential effects of soil contamination from the uranium refinery on the agricultural industry;  the 
Canadian Union of Public Employees and the National Farmers Union voiced their opposition to 
the refinery, citing potential risks to the physical environment and worker safety as well as issues 
with the association to the nuclear fuel cycle; and church groups from a variety of denominations 
raised objections and concerns over the construction of the refinery.
71
  One spokesman, John 
Polloch, representing the Social Action Committee of the Diocesan Pastoral Council, St. Peter‟s 
Abbacy, stated that, “while aware of the beneficial effects of uranium mining on the economy of 
the province, there are serious questions which remain unanswered.  No satisfactory way has 
been developed to deal with nuclear wastes [sic].  There can be no guarantee that uranium mines 
in Saskatchewan will not be used to create nuclear armaments.”72  Along with the groups 
mentioned, the Saskatoon Citizens for a Non-Nuclear Society attended the hearings to support 
the opposition to any nuclear related project; the refinery was no exception.   
 During the period of the hearings, certain individuals in both government and academia 
also mobilized to oppose the refinery.  M.L.A. for the Saskatoon-Sutherland Constituency, Peter 
Prebble, stated, “If this refinery is built…there will still only be 7 uranium refineries in the entire 
Western world.  Each will be either the feedstock source for nuclear electricity production, or for 
nuclear weapons.
73”  Dr. Jim Harding, a sociology professor at the University of Regina, made 
the argument that nuclear energy and nuclear war cannot be separated, “Since nuclear war is the 
ultimate threat to public health, and would constitute all-out genocide against the human 
race…it‟s also mandatory for your panel (the federal inquiry) to consider the implications of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal into War Crimes for people working in the nuclear fuel cycle.  It‟s not 
uncommon for people working in the nuclear industry to try to dissociate their activities at one 
point in the fuel cycle from ultimate consequences at another point.”74  Like Prebble and 
Harding, many Saskatchewan citizens believed that refining uranium in the province linked the 
province to the creation of nuclear weapons.  While anecdotal, these arguments reflect the fears 
of many individuals with regard to upgrading uranium. 
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 Overall, the uranium refinery did not have overwhelming public support at any stage of 
the proposal process and the well organized anti-uranium group had little trouble raising doubts 
about the socio-economic benefits of a refinery and about the moral action of this endeavour.  
With the already existing discord between the provincial government and Eldorado Nuclear, the 
future of the refinery proposal was tenuous and the strong negative sentiment in the public 
consultations left little hope for construction.   
 The Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office released its report on August 6, 
1980.  The report concluded that at the technical level there were no objections to the 
construction of a uranium refinery in the Warman area but, as a result of the outcomes of the 
public hearings, an apparent deficiency existed in the assessment of potential socio-economic 
outcomes.
75
  The technical aspect of their report 
1) concluded that the refinery would have no significant health or environmental 
impacts, providing that the company fulfilled its commitments regarding waste 
disposal, public involvement and health monitoring; 
2) felt the production of uranium hexafluoride by the new plant would not be a 
significant factor in nuclear weapons proliferation; 
3) agreed that there was a need for another world scale refinery; 
4) found that a Saskatchewan site was „consistent with federal and Saskatchewan 
government policies‟; and 
5) felt a Saskatchewan site compares favourably with other options, such as a site in 
Ontario.
76
 
However, the panel‟s recognition of the sound technical plan was not enough to give an overall 
recommendation to move forward without greater investigation into the social impact of the 
project on nearby communities.  The report stated concerns regarding the impact of outside 
influence on the local institutions and the possible encroachment on agricultural practices.  
Furthermore, the panel noted the potential of conflict between the project and the moral and 
religious beliefs of individuals in the local communities.  With these concerns at the forefront of 
their conclusions the panel recommended three options: 
1) further studies be done on Warman to assess the social impact of the project; 
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2) other Saskatchewan sites be selected and evaluated in terms of environmental and 
social impact of the refinery; and 
3) a combination of the above.77 
Although the recommendations by the panel did coincide with the wishes of the provincial 
government, the likelihood of Eldorado Nuclear complying with these recommendations was 
slim.   
 Shortly after the panel released its report, Premier Blakeney stated that he agreed with the 
report‟s recommendation to assess additional sites.  However, knowing that Eldorado Nuclear 
was extremely reluctant to pursue this avenue the provincial government likely believed that the 
hopes for a refinery were finished.  On September 29, 1980, Eldorado Nuclear‟s decisions not to 
renegotiate a two-year extension on the land options and to drop its options on the Warman site 
confirmed this belief.
78
  This action was perceived by the provincial government as a rejection of 
the Warman site.  In a last ditch effort, business organizations such as the Prince Albert and 
Saskatoon Chambers of Commerce and their respective municipal governments attempted to 
open discussions with Eldorado Nuclear for a refinery to their regions. They were unsuccessful.  
Eldorado Nuclear had decided to begin construction in an area with minimal public resistance 
and put forward plans to expand its capacity in Blind River, Ontario.  As the provincial 
government had foreseen, the lack of shoring up public support for the refinery resulted in 
unfavorable public hearings.  As a consequence, the federal panel could not support the 
construction of the refinery, ending the prospect of uranium cycle expansion in the province for 
the time being. 
 Talks of expansion in the uranium cycle entered a 25 year hiatus in Saskatchewan after 
the failure to secure the uranium refinery in Warman.  Just eight years later the Canadian and 
Saskatchewan governments agreed to merge Eldorado Nuclear and the Saskatchewan Mining 
Development Corporation.  The new company, Cameco Corporation, became fully privatized 
through public share offerings over the next seven years.  Through internal growth and 
expansion through purchases, Cameco emerged as a leader in uranium mining and in 2009 was 
the largest high-grade uranium producer in the world. 
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4.5 Bargains During the Refinery Process 
Although the effort to gain a refinery for Saskatchewan did not end the way the 
provincial government hoped, the process gives insight into the structures and bargains 
associated with the uranium industry.  The structures in the uranium industry during the 1970s 
and 1980s remained primarily under state control.  To no surprise, the importance of 
international security continued to dominate uranium policy and the state held most decision 
making power.   
Recognizing the opportunity created by the international energy crisis, the Blakeney 
government made the first move to begin discussions of expanding Saskatchewan‟s uranium 
industry.  Changing the mineral policy and creating SMDC not only allowed the provincial 
government to broaden its range of relationships, with particular focus on new investment from 
outside industry, but also increased awareness outside the province of Saskatchewan‟s intent to 
refocus on the uranium business.  Shortly after its creation, SMDC went to work in creating new 
links with out-of-province corporations, a German uranium mining company, Uranerz, being the 
first.  With the new-found success of building partnerships, the NDP government looked to 
expand the range of development in Saskatchewan and this included expanding the uranium life 
cycle. 
During the 1970s, Eldorado Nuclear served as the primary developer and operator of 
nuclear power plants in Canada and, although Saskatchewan already held ties to Eldorado 
through the mining operations, a uranium refinery required a unique set of bargains between 
industry and the province.  The initial set of bargains established in the partnership between the 
province and Eldorado Nuclear focused on purchasing land rights for the construction of the 
proposed refinery; the provincial government (SEDCO) engaged in the negotiations on behalf of 
Eldorado Nuclear, an arrangement that benefitted both parties.  However, this bargain exhibited a 
lack of transparency that triggered skepticism later in the process.  Determining the impact of the 
transparency (or lack thereof) in the dealings between the Saskatchewan government and 
Eldorado Nuclear remains immeasurable, but perhaps displays the perceived desire of the 
province and federal crown to keep their intent out of the public eye for as long as possible.  And 
although state driven initiatives before this era rarely undertook public consultation, the attempt 
to push forward policy in an era of changing governance structures did not help the provincial 
government. 
48 
 
Another set of bargains critical to the refinery proposal came with the agreement between 
the Saskatchewan government and Eldorado Nuclear to begin a series of feasibility studies in the 
province to determine the ideal location for the proposed uranium refinery.  The first of the three 
rounds completed without issue from either the provincial government or Eldorado Nuclear.  
However, the cooperation between Blakeney‟s government and Eldorado Nuclear began to show 
signs of weakness moving forward in the process.  Eldorado Nuclear believed it did due 
diligence in the final two stages of the viability study and that the selection of Warman met all 
criteria establishing at the beginning of the process.  One the other hand, while the province 
perhaps agreed with the selection of the Warman site (they had after all aided Eldorado in 
securing land in the Warman area), it refused to accept the final stages of the feasibility study.  
Part of this refusal stemmed from mounting public pressure on the government to conduct more 
thorough investigations into the most viable site.  Consequently, many of the bargains 
established between the province and Eldorado Nuclear at the beginning of the process 
evaporated when the time came for the federal inquiry.  As a result, the federal inquiry could not 
recommend the construction of a uranium refinery until further studies on socio-economic 
impacts took place, a conclusion expected given the discord between the province and the 
industry. 
The uranium refinery proposal era exemplifies a structured and relatively closed process 
in governance.  Because the state controlled a majority of the structures related to the uranium 
industry, ranging from regulatory structures to production structures, the breadth of bargains 
remained limited.  Consultation with the public occurred only after the state decision to pursue a 
uranium refinery and, therefore, public response remained limited to support or opposition to a 
specific project.  Further, consultation did not extend beyond the public hearings.  Neither the 
provincial government nor the federal government approached First Nations communities for 
input in the process.  Environmental groups also remained absent from directly participating in 
the refinery process.  During this era, however, the inclusion of non-state or non-industry actors 
remained a rarity in a centralized system.  The value of input from communities and non-
government organizations began to gain traction in the 1970s and 1980s and only became 
normalized a couple decades later.  A governance system that facilitated open discussion may 
have yielded different results for the Blakeney government, but the failure of understanding and 
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lack of familiarity between the Saskatchewan government and Eldorado Nuclear, state and 
industry, proved to be the key factor in the failure of the refinery proposal. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
2007-2010: NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION 
5.1 Introduction 
 In 2007, the Saskatchewan Party ran on an election platform that included and promoted 
expansion of the uranium industry, then won the election and formed government.  Similar to the 
Blakeney and the Warman uranium refinery era, Saskatchewan engaged in debate over the 
viability of expansion in the uranium sector.  Chapter five analyses the following four parts of 
the uranium discussions that occurred between 2007 and 2009: (1) change in the political 
climate, (2) the Uranium Development Partnership (UDP), (3) the government, corporate and 
public response to the UDP report, and (4) the public consultations on nuclear energy.   
5.2 Structures in the Present Uranium Industry 
 Relative to the refinery process during the 1970s, the uranium industry in today‟s system 
includes a variety of actors in the four core structures.  Although security remains an important 
structure in today‟s uranium industry, the unipolar system creates more predictability than the 
bipolar system of the 1970s and therefore the necessity for direct oversight from the state 
lessened.  The regulatory framework, established by the state at both the federal and provincials 
levels, remains stricter for uranium than other natural resources due to the historic association 
with weapons manufacturing, but the means of production began opening to the market and 
private corporations. 
 A fundamental shift in the production structures between the Blakeney and Wall 
governments lies with the change from Crown corporations to private corporations.  After the 
provincial and federal governments made the decision to merge and privatize Eldorado Nuclear 
and SMDC to create the privately controlled and publicly traded Cameco Corporation, the state 
no longer dominated uranium mining operations in Saskatchewan.  For the next two decades 
Cameco grew, emerged as the largest uranium producer globally in the late 2000s, and played an 
integral role in renewing the strength of the Saskatchewan economy.  Beyond mining, however, 
Saskatchewan held little involvement in the uranium industry and the provincial government 
recognized that new partnerships and processes needed to emerge to promote new growth in the 
industry. 
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 The financial structures in the current uranium era involve a greater range of actors due in 
large part to the increased corporate involvement.  Since the 1970s the landscape of the 
Saskatchewan uranium industry changed substantially with a majority of mining operations 
conducted by private corporations.  Opening the province to the competition of the market 
divided the financial structure between state and market.  The provincial government no longer 
held responsibility of financing the day-to-day exploratory and mining operations, instead 
focusing on its regulatory role.  However, if the provincial government hoped to expand the 
uranium industry, a project required longer-term financial partnerships between state and market.  
Long-term contracts with the Crown power utility, SaskPower, were critical to provide price 
protection on energy and to justify the substantial initial capital investment.  These types of 
complicated contracts required a greater level of coordination between state and market than in 
the 1970s-80s. 
 The knowledge structures in the current era of the uranium industry place greater 
emphasis on the research and development aspect than in the past.  The University of 
Saskatchewan increased its association with the uranium industry over the past two decades in 
the area of research and, consequently, participated in the UDP process to determine the future 
for uranium in Saskatchewan.  Further, the U of S engaged in a partnership with the provincial 
government to put forward a bid to the federal government to produce medical isotopes.  
Knowledge structures shifted from the production-centric focus of the 1970s to a more diverse 
range of knowledge including an emphasis on research and development, allowing the province 
to explore an increased scope of possibilities moving forward.  Further, the focus of industrial 
expansion increasingly included a socio-economic element.  After the release of the 1983 “Red 
Book” (“Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process”) by the National 
Research Council, risk assessment became a normalized area in policy creation.  Precipitated by 
the advances in the economy and in technology, a method to measure risk quantitatively became 
necessary, particularly with respect to an industry such as uranium.
79
  Ensuring human safety in 
uranium and nuclear development, therefore, meets specific guidelines in the post-“Red Book” 
era, a socio-economic concern that existed in the Blakeney era that has since been addressed. 
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Table 5.1 
Structures in the 2000s Saskatchewan Uranium Industry 
Security Production Finance Knowledge 
Unipolar system 
continues to require 
state (provincial and 
federal) oversight 
and regulatory 
policy, but lower 
focus on global 
security (Cameco 
operating in 
Kazakhstan) 
Production now held 
by private 
corporations, both 
domestic (Cameco) 
and foreign (Areva), 
while production 
levels remain 
regulated by 
government 
Long-term contracts 
between state and 
market, increased 
private credit to 
promote growth 
Universities and 
research centres 
heavily involved in 
the uranium 
industry, increased 
innovation  
 
 In the 25 years since the refinery debate, the governance model in the uranium industry 
evolved to include a greater variety of actors.  State and market actors now engage in day-to-day 
relations with open lines of communication.  Societal actors also play a much stronger role in the 
present governance model, as both the state and the market allow more dialogue between 
themselves and representatives from communities and non-government organizations.  However, 
the extent to which a broad spectrum of actors influence decision-making remains to be seen 
with research institutions such as the university dominating the discourse. 
Figure 5.1 
 
  The increase of actors participating in a more open policy process requires a different model of 
policy analysis and the rounds model better fits the current era of governance.  From the 
beginning of the nuclear energy debates a number of actors have provided varying degrees of 
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influence in a number of stages from provincial election to the UDP process to the provincial 
government announcement to postpone plans for a nuclear power plant. 
5.3 Change in the Political Climate 
 The defeat of the NDP in Saskatchewan and the first election win by the Saskatchewan 
Party had immediate effects on the uranium industry in the province.  One of the key platforms 
the Saskatchewan Party ran on in the 2007 election was the expansion of the uranium industry.  
Brad Wall, the Saskatchewan Party leader and provincial premier following the election, openly 
stated his intent to refocus the government‟s efforts on the uranium industry.  The province was 
and continues to be the largest uranium producer in the world and the Saskatchewan Party 
argued that priority should be placed in an area of unique opportunity.  The newly elected 
provincial government kept their election promise and quickly went to work assembling a panel 
tasked with identifying the most desirable and viable option for the future of uranium in 
Saskatchewan.  The panel, the Uranium Development Partnership (UDP), consisted of 
representatives from business, labour, the environmental community, and academia and set out 
in October of 2008 to gather evidence and make recommendations for the province. 
 The re-emergence of uranium as a vital mineral within the province‟s economic 
development strategy and the perceived need of the Saskatchewan Party to move in a new 
direction is a result of global events.  As in the 1970s, energy security is once again a great 
concern for public officials and policy makers.  The known fossil fuel reserves are dwindling and 
their price is sharply higher than in earlier decades.  As the reserves shrink and prices inflate the 
demand for energy also continues to grow.  The global population is increasing daily and some 
new technologies (oil sand extraction) demand more power.  Procuring new resources, ironically, 
also calls for more energy consumption.  A clear example of this exists in Alberta where the 
processing of oil sands will require more energy than is currently available on the electrical grid.  
This leaves many nations at the mercy of global markets and, with the memories of the OPEC 
embargo still relatively fresh in their minds, the search for and adoption of alternative sources of 
energy remains an important policy path.   
 The search for alternative sources of energy is also fueled by the current concern of rapid 
global climate change and increasing worldwide recognition of the problems it creates.  Fossil 
fuels became the primary energy source globally, particularly in developed nations, emitting the 
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harmful carbon dioxide; therefore, a majority of energy produced today also fuels a global 
environmental crisis.  There is now mounting pressure to find alternative sources of energy to 
reduce the negative effects of climate change.  These alternatives include wind, solar, hydro and 
nuclear, each with their respective positives and negatives.  What makes nuclear energy 
particularly attractive in Saskatchewan is the relative abundance of uranium found within the 
province as well as the existing infrastructure associated with uranium mining.  These factors 
make nuclear energy expansion within the province an attractive option. 
 In the middle of the debate the shutdown of the Chalk River nuclear reactor due to safety 
concerns raised the stakes.  The Chalk River reactor was responsible for producing medical 
isotopes and as a result of its temporary closure there existed a global shortage of medical 
isotopes.  This provided a window of opportunity for Saskatchewan and the premier was vocal in 
his interest in pursuing an isotope reactor for the province.  The result was an agreement between 
the provincial government and the University of Saskatchewan to enter a partnership to produce 
medical isotopes.  One way or the other, Saskatchewan appeared to be on a path to expanding the 
uranium industry. 
 After the failure to bring a uranium refinery to Warman the idea of expanding the 
uranium cycle within the province died down.  Political parties shied away from uranium 
expansion in recognition of the strong voice of opposition at the public consultations at Warman.  
This limited the value-added debate around uranium for the next two decades.  The 2007 
provincial election provided an opportunity for the idea of uranium expansion to be addressed 
once again.  The Saskatchewan Party had narrowly lost the previous election in 2003 with the 
NDP winning 30 seats to the Saskatchewan Party‟s 28 but the 2007 pre-election polls showed an 
almost certain Saskatchewan Party victory.  The Saskatchewan Party ran on the assertion that 
Saskatchewan had tremendous potential that the NDP, it argued, had failed to tap.  Part of this 
potential, they stated, is found in the natural resources within the province and the party 
promised that if elected they would create Enterprise Saskatchewan, “a new public-private 
partnership between government, business, labour, First Nations, municipalities, post-secondary 
institutions and economic stakeholders.”80 
 The Saskatchewan Party made clear that one of the purposes of Enterprise Saskatchewan 
was to re-open a uranium discussion in the province, a topic the NDP was reluctant to discuss.  
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In their 2007 platform, the Saskatchewan Party asserted, “Enterprise Saskatchewan will: support 
research, development and the commercialization of innovation in activities related to energy, 
mining and agriculture; work with the federal government to increase the number of value-added 
initiatives for Saskatchewan‟s natural resource industries; explore and identify uranium value-
added opportunities; and review and address tax measures, infrastructure barriers and export 
barriers to asses in the value-added development of our natural resources.
81”  The Saskatchewan 
Party believed that the general public in the province were willing to re-engage in a value-added 
uranium debate and this was a point that they could use to set themselves apart from the NDP, 
particularly given the mixed message from the NDP caucus on the issue. 
 It was no secret in the province that for many years the NDP viewed themselves as 
reluctant partners with the uranium industry and the producers such as Cameco and Areva.  One 
key exception was Blakeney who accepted and even encouraged uranium expansion in 
Saskatchewan.  Even more surprisingly, he did this at a time when uranium was viewed as a 
particularly dangerous mineral as a result of its association with American and British nuclear 
weapons programmes a decade before Blakeney was elected.  During the 2007 election 
campaign the specific issue of value-added uranium expansion was not heavily critiqued by the 
NDP, likely due in part to some of its own members supporting expansion.  Instead, the entire 
idea of Enterprise Saskatchewan drew most of the criticism, but this gained little traction with 
the voters.  The Saskatchewan Party interpreted their win as at least partly based on a platform 
that included a clear intent to revisit uranium expansion in Saskatchewan, including nuclear 
energy.  The government reiterated this sentiment post election and then began the process the 
following fall when the Uranium Development Partnership was formed. 
5.4 The Uranium Development Partnership 
 In October 2008 the Saskatchewan government created a panel, the Uranium 
Development Partnership (UDP), tasked with assessing the possibility of uranium expansion in 
the province.  The group consisted of members of a variety of organizations with the intent of 
including as many voices as possible pertinent to a discussion of value-added uranium.  This 
meant an examination of the current environment of uranium, both within the province and 
outside markets, and a determination of whether value-added was appropriate for Saskatchewan 
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and, if so, what form this expansion should take.  The UDP panel drew criticism immediately 
from groups who believed that the provincial government had already made up its mind, that 
uranium expansion would occur and it was just a matter of how to proceed.  Dr. Richard 
Florizone, the Vice President of Finance and Resources at the University of Saskatchewan and 
who holds a Ph.D in nuclear physics, chaired the UDP.  Eleven more members formed the UDP 
including: Ray Ahenakew, the former chief executive officer of the Meadow Lake Tribal 
Council (which had proposed nuclear waste management under his leadership) and current 
President of Saskatchewan Indian Institute of Technology; Jerry Grandey, the President and 
CEO of Cameco; Duncan Hawthorne, the President and CEO of Bruce Power; Armand 
Laferrere, the President and CEO of Areva; Dr. Patrick Moore, the co-founder and former 
President of Greenpeace Canada (who has since split from Greenpeace); Neil Collins, a former 
member of the SaskPower Board of Directors; Allan Earle, the President of the Saskatchewan 
Urban Municipalities Association; Jim Hallick, the Vice President of the Saskatchewan 
Association of Rural Municipalities; Dr. Edward Mathie, a Professor of Nuclear Physics at the 
University of Regina; and Alex Pourbaix, the President of Energy, TransCanada Corporation.  
The purpose of this composition was to strike a balance between the corporate and 
environmental perspectives, providing advice for the provincial government to keep the province 
competitive globally in the uranium sector. 
 Because of the complexity of the uranium industry, the panel required diversity in its 
membership.  Finding the right balance became a critical point for the legitimacy of the panel.  
Florizone, the panel chair, stated in an interview with the Star Phoenix, “I think the best policy or 
strategy comes when you bring people together from different backgrounds.”82  Florizone also 
indicated that despite the obvious ties members of the panel had with their respective 
associations, communities, corporations, and interest groups, the panel had the responsibility to 
remain fair in making recommendations.  The mandate of the panel, handed down by the 
provincial government, required unbiased analysis of the current state of the uranium industry in 
Saskatchewan and objectivity in the final report.  However, the level of objectivity in the panel 
remained a problem for some groups.  Ann Coxworth, a research advisor at the Saskatchewan 
Environmental Society, rejected an invitation to participate in the UDP because she believed that 
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some answers the panel needed to provide were already foregone conclusions.  “I think it‟s got a 
clearly pro-nuclear development mandate and their question is not whether to proceed with 
development, but how,” she stated in reference to the composition of the UDP panel.83  She 
continued, “(the group) might objectively look at a range of options like (enrichment, waste 
disposal and nuclear energy) and consider which would be the least problematic for the province 
to look in to, but I don‟t see that they are mandated to look objectively at whether or not this is 
the right direction for Saskatchewan to be pursuing in the first place.”84  Unsurprisingly, 
skepticism over uranium development remained since the Warman refinery era and the anti-
uranium presence in the province persisted as displayed in the consultations later in the process.  
Coxworth and the Saskatchewan Environmental Society held the view the uranium development 
should not be pursued; rather, other alternative sources of energy should be the priority for the 
Saskatchewan government, a view shared by many other anti-uranium groups.  However, the 
Saskatchewan Party kept steady in their intent to explore all options for uranium development 
and the UDP did not hide their desire to follow through on this intent. 
 The Saskatchewan Party made clear during their 2007 election campaign and reiterated 
thereafter that keeping the province economically competitive was a key priority.  After the 
election the sentiment did not change and the new provincial government kept its promise to 
explore all possible avenues for expanding on the existing uranium industry.  This meant an 
analysis of the current practices in all aspects of the Saskatchewan uranium industry, a task 
which the UDP was commissioned to carry out.   
 The report submitted on March 31, 2009 by the Uranium Development Partnership, 
“Capturing the full potential of the uranium value chain in Saskatchewan,” laid out four key 
approaches in their evaluation of opportunities for Saskatchewan uranium.  They: 
1) identified specific commercial opportunities at each step of the chain, examining both 
uranium‟s life cycle and its end-use applications, such as power generation, taking 
into account the key economic, technical, and environmental trends and forces at 
work and around the world; 
2) evaluated the business case for each opportunity, assessing each opportunity‟s 
commercial viability based on its market fundamentals (in terms of demand, supply, 
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and growth) and Saskatchewan‟s competitive strengths and weaknesses relative to 
those of its global competitors; this assessment resulted in a financial evaluation of 
the full life cycle economics of each opportunity; 
3) estimated the potential benefits accruing to Saskatchewan from each opportunity, 
calculating the GDP impact and job creating potential based on industry standard 
models of both the direct and the indirect economic impact; and 
4) created a strategy for pursuing the opportunities over time and developed clear 
recommendations to inform discussions and decision making.
85
 
Like other feasibility studies, the UDP panel studied a broad range of variables in determining 
the best path forward and relevant recommendations for the province.  The final report offered 
recommendations organized into five areas of the uranium industry: exploration and mining, 
upgrading, power generation, used fuel management, and research, development, and training.   
 In exploration and mining, the panel found that Saskatchewan remains the global leader, 
but this position is threatened by nations such as Australia and Kazakhstan.  As uranium prices 
continue to rise, the province needs to expand its existing operations to remain competitive 
globally.  This requires a reassessment of the current regulatory system, infrastructure in the 
north, and the duty to consult process with First Nations and Métis.
86
  In upgrading, the strong 
likelihood for increase in the global demand for enriched uranium is most effectively met 
through expansion in existing facilities, particularly in the United States and France.  
Saskatchewan should not pursue development in the current generation of uranium enrichment; 
rather, focus should be placed on the next generation technology – laser isotope separation.87  In 
used fuel management, the panel suggested passing on reprocessing facilities, for the short term, 
and instead focus on the Nuclear Waste Management Organization‟s depository decision making 
process.  The report argues that hosting the long-term repository provides significant 
employment and GDP benefits for the province.
88
  In research, development, and training, the 
panel premised this area of uranium development with the nuclear power generation.  The 
suggestion made for a “center of excellence for nuclear research and training with a dual mission 
of: 1) supporting the existing nuclear industry in Saskatchewan; and 2) developing a nuclear 
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R&D programmes to support emerging opportunities.”89  These recommendations made by the 
panel did not surprise critics or supporters, given the mandate of the provincial government.  
However, the recommendations for nuclear power generation spurred the greatest interest.   
 In addition to the Saskatchewan government‟s desire to find the best avenue for 
expanding the uranium value chain, the panel gave three key reasons for exploring nuclear power 
generation within the province.  First, the need for electricity continues to grow and as the 
planned decommissioning of existing power generation facilities approaches the province needs 
to find alternative energy sources.  Nuclear power generation potentially fills this need.  Second, 
energy needs also exist outside of the province and Saskatchewan could provide low-carbon 
emission power to neighbors such as Alberta, particularly for the oil sands.  Third, the 
construction of a nuclear power plant would boost the Saskatchewan economy.  The report 
estimated a nuclear power development adds $12 billion GDP to the province over the lifespan 
of the power plant, $1.2 billion during construction and $10.6 during operation.  As well, a 
nuclear power plant creates 3000 person years of employment during the construction phase and 
between 400 and 700 long-term jobs during the operation phase.
90
 
 At the most basic level the purpose of nuclear power generation is the creation of energy.  
However, as the UDP findings purport, Saskatchewan is uniquely situated to take advantage of 
existing infrastructure and meet the challenges of the future.  The UDP panel estimates in their 
report that electricity use in Saskatchewan between 2009 and 2020 will grow 1.5 percent 
annually.  Baseload demand – the minimum level of electricity required by a grid at any time – is 
forecast to increase from approximately 2500 megawatts (MW) to 3750 MW by 2020.  In 
conjunction with the gradual increase in electricity demand, a current power generator, the 
Boundary Dam, is scheduled for decommission, creating a 540 MW deficit.  The combination of 
these factors means a possible 1500 MW deficit in 2020 and 2600 MW deficit in 2030.
91
  Filling 
the energy need with uranium powered nuclear energy could serve two purposes.  One, the 
addition of nuclear energy to the province fits the Saskatchewan government‟s policy agenda.  
The Saskatchewan Party ran on the platform of developing domestic resources and existing 
industry and the construction, research, and development of nuclear energy could fulfill this 
election promise.  Two, environmental concerns over the long-term effects of carbon emissions 
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encourage finding low-emission alternatives.  This arose due to awareness of global climate 
change in the academic community and the general public, ensuring government attention to this 
policy challenge.  Therefore, the possibility of nuclear energy presents a clear opportunity for the 
provincial government.  The necessity for additional energy offset through a low-carbon 
electricity sources appeared to be an ideal policy solution for the Saskatchewan government.   
However, questions remained over the viability of nuclear energy in comparison with 
other low-carbon electricity alternatives and the benefits and challenges for the province.  The 
UDP panel attempted to respond to criticism in their report.  They agreed that wind and solar 
energy are potential clean energy sources for Saskatchewan.  Nevertheless, the high start-up 
costs and lack of reliability mean that, at best, these renewable sources potentially only serve as a 
supplement to the baseload power supply.  Therefore, in low-carbon electricity generation for 
Saskatchewan, the nuclear power plant remains, according to the panel, the best policy 
solution.
92
  
 In addition to the benefits of potentially cleaner energy for Saskatchewan, according to 
the UDP panel, the opportunities for creating new jobs and exporting energy make the nuclear 
reactor a promising investment.  As stated earlier, a nuclear power plant adds roughly $12 billion 
to the provincial GDP over its lifespan.  Also, it creates approximately 3000 person years of 
employment during construction and between 400 and 700 long-term jobs during operation.  
Although the direct benefits to Saskatchewan held greatest importance, part of the attraction in 
pursuing nuclear power generation existed in the possibility for power export.  The UDP report 
estimates that Alberta could face a 4000 to 5000 MW power deficit by 2020 and Saskatchewan is 
well-positioned to fill this deficit.
93
  The combination of population growth in Alberta‟s large 
cities and the energy intensive processes such as upgrading bitumen and steam-assisted gravity 
drainage in the oil sands potentially places Alberta in a position requiring additional energy.  
However, construction and planning of a nuclear reactor brings a new set of policy challenges for 
the province. 
 The planning, implementation, and construction of a nuclear reactor is a highly complex 
process, particularly if the development is a first for the region.  These challenges, broadly 
defined, include the social, environmental, and technical issues associated with construction of a 
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nuclear power plant.  Social challenges include finding a willing-host location – a community 
willing to accept the risks and inconveniences of a nuclear plant in close proximity in return for 
the potential economic rewards.  The environmental challenges meant finding a suitable location 
for the power plant while incurring minimal ecological damage.  Technical challenges for the 
province range from licensing to construction.  The UDP report points out that if Saskatchewan 
decided to pursue nuclear energy, the reactor design would be a Generation III(+).  This type of 
construction, a first for Saskatchewan, poses many start-up difficulties such as the 
aforementioned licensing, as well as labour availability and supply of materials.  In terms of 
licensing, the panel states that the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) last reviewed a 
construction license in the 1980s for the Darlington project in Ontario.  This, in combination 
with limited experience with Generations III(+) reactors, could mean a long licensing period, a 
detrimental delay for the province.
94
  This, however, opens opportunities to cooperate and 
communicate with governments, such as Ontario, who already know many of the challenges 
associated with nuclear energy start-up.  Regardless of these challenges, the UDP panel 
recommendation for nuclear energy stood and the province faced the challenge of crafting 
proposals and gaining public support. 
5.5 Response to the UDP Report 
 The conclusions drawn in the UDP report left little ambiguity about its positive 
recommendation for nuclear energy.  The Saskatchewan government, therefore, believed they 
possessed the information necessary to move forward in pursuing value-added opportunities.  
Shortly after receiving the report, the Minister of Innovation and Enterprise, Lyle Stewart, said, 
"The UDP report has, for the first time in the province's history, put forward a thoughtful, 
measured and well-researched strategic plan to revitalize and expand Saskatchewan's uranium 
industry.”95  The report reaffirmed the direction the Saskatchewan government wanted to pursue.  
Finding value-added opportunities in the uranium industry appeared increasingly viable and, at 
the time, the province did not hesitate in pursuing this objective.  Stewart acknowledged, 
however, that before any concrete decision-making with regard to nuclear energy, a public 
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consultation process needed to take place.  Even before the UDP panel released their report, 
posturing between the provincial government, the opposition, private corporations, and anti-
uranium groups already started.   
 The premier, Brad Wall, did not shy away from the question of uranium development 
during the 2007 election campaign and after winning the election continued to contribute to the 
growing discourse on the nuclear issue.  On February 26, 2009, Wall delivered a speech to the 
Canadian Nuclear Association in Ottawa on Saskatchewan‟s current and future role in the 
uranium industry.  He argued that although currently Saskatchewan enjoys its place at the top of 
the uranium mining industry globally, the province has the opportunity to rebrand itself: “it is the 
vision of our government that our brand with respect to this resource is one that will involve 
electrons and one that will involve amazing value-added potential in medical research, in perhaps 
reactor technology development.
96”  Wall noted Saskatchewan had a long history of working 
with nuclear materials, including the first Cobalt 60 treatment on November 8, 1951, at the 
University of Saskatchewan, a global first.  Since then, he continued, although the province 
maintains its strong presence in mining, Saskatchewan has not been a leader of in the research 
and innovation side of the uranium industry.  The current Saskatchewan government vision is 
designed to change that.  He continued, “…the new Government of Saskatchewan is committed 
to creating the business environment, the research climate, is prepared to partner with real 
resources and provide the right environment so that we may thoroughly explore the chance for 
our province to be a leader in value-added opportunities related to this great resource.”97  The 
message from Wall is clear; the province wants to create an environment that fosters the growth 
and expansion of the uranium industry.  Research remains a necessary component and the 
opportunity for expanding other value-added ventures remains an open possibility. 
 Even though Wall delivered the speech just over one month before the UDP report 
became public, it appears he correctly anticipated the impending outcome.  He referenced two 
specific points that correlate closely to the recommendations made in the report.  First, he 
stressed the current opportunity for small reactor technology in Saskatchewan.  He argued that 
the interest that corporations such as Bruce Power have invested into the province should not be 
overlooked.  However, he assured citizens of the province that their input is necessary moving 
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forward.  Second, he reiterated the importance in revisiting the mining industry to ensure 
Saskatchewan remains a global leader in uranium.  Revising the regulatory process, a 
combination of provincial and federal requirements, he argued is necessary for the advancement 
of the industry in Saskatchewan.
98
  Although little debate occurred over the importance of 
uranium mining, the central message of the Wall speech, pursuing value-added opportunities, 
remained the main point of contention between opposing voices in the province. 
 Global events, however, began to impact the viability of investing large capital into a 
nuclear energy project.  The collapse of American financial markets due to the credit crunch and 
the subsequent recession in economies worldwide, a problem largely unforeseen during the 2007 
provincial election, made an impact on the government of Saskatchewan‟s economic outlook.  
The significant boom in the provincial economy, now tempered by the global bust, challenged 
government to justify massive capital costs to the public.  The speech at the Canadian Nuclear 
Association delivered by Wall, although still supportive of uranium expansion, did not convey 
the message of pursuing nuclear energy as strongly.  While presenting a positive message, 
managing both corporate and public expectations became increasingly pertinent to the nuclear 
development issue.   
 Two weeks after the Wall speech, a poll of 635 Prince Albert citizens, conducted by 
Demar Consulting Associates, revealed that 71 percent responded „yes‟ to the question of 
wanting to attract Bruce Power to the region while 24 percent said „no.‟  The other 5 percent did 
not answer.  Allan Hopkins, chair of the Prince Albert Chamber of Commerce, expected this type 
of response, “I think people are looking for economic development in the city, so I think 
anything that‟s going to bring that to Prince Albert is going to be a good thing.99”  The Bruce 
Power chief executive, Duncan Hawthorne, echoed the support for development in 
Saskatchewan, in spite of the recent economic downturn.  Because a nuclear reactor takes several 
years before construction begins, the delay for many of the substantial costs enables governments 
and potential partners to look beyond the current recession.  “The economic climate is a cause 
for concern for all of us, but that doesn‟t necessarily mean that those conditions will still be there 
when it comes time to make a big investment decision.”100 
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 The potential for weaker economic conditions down the road and additional money 
committed to a controversial project could mean defeat for the current government in the next 
election.  Minister of Enterprise and Innovation, Lyle Stewart, retreated even further than the 
premier in regard to the possibility of nuclear energy, “I suppose there‟s a possibility that the 
economic downturn could play a major role in this thing.  Could be a deal-killer in fact.”101  This 
statement gave a clear indication that Saskatchewan‟s plans for nuclear energy experienced a 
blow with the global economic recession.  Stewart continued, “But a nuclear build for 
Saskatchewan would be some years down the road and I would expect – and certainly hope for – 
different economic circumstances by then.”102  These statements came two weeks before the 
release of the UDP report and although they did not discount the recommendations made in the 
report, they tempered expectations for those in favour of the immediate pursuit for nuclear 
power.  The provincial government, however, still desired to expand its capabilities in uranium 
and the opportunity for research and medicine now presented itself. 
 Days before the UDP panel made their recommendations public, Minister Stewart and the 
Minister of Energy and Resources, Bill Boyd, announced they signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) with Bill Rogers, associate laboratory director at the Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL), on March 17, 2009.
103
  The INL is a nuclear research laboratory in the United 
States, considered one of the best in that country.  The collaboration possible with the MOU 
allows the province to move forward in establishing a nuclear center of excellence in 
Saskatchewan.  The government still intended to pursue uranium expansion but now the area of 
focus started to change. 
 After the release of the UDP report, the provincial government cautioned that although 
the findings offered exciting possibilities, these possibilities needed public support.  Before 
nuclear energy can become a reality, a public consultation process is necessary.  However, as the 
government prepared for public input into the energy question, the importance of uranium 
research became increasingly pertinent.  Just as Wall alluded to in his speech, the significance of 
nuclear research in the realm of medicine is a global issue.  The Saskatchewan government 
intended to explore all avenues with regard to uranium expansion, including nuclear medicine.  
On May 14, 2009, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) shut down the National Research 
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Universal (NRU) reactor at Chalk River after the detection of a heavy water leak at the base of 
the reactor due to corrosion.
104
  The repairs took one month to complete and resulted in a global 
medical isotope shortage.  This was the third global shortage in three years.  The first shortage 
occurred in 2007 when Chalk River needed maintenance and global demand outgrew supply.  
Then in 2008 the world experienced a global isotope shortage due to the scheduled maintenance 
of four major isotope producers in the Netherlands, Belgium, France and South Africa.  The 
trend of global isotope shortage in combination with the second recent shutdown of a Canadian 
facility presented a timely opportunity for the Saskatchewan government to expand its own 
industry. 
 From the premier‟s speech in February to the temporary closure of the Chalk River 
reactor in May, the opportunity for expansion in isotope reactors firmed up.  The Saskatchewan 
government, keen on finding an avenue for value-added expansion, took the opportunity to 
express its interest in the isotope business.  Premier Wall gave a clear statement that exploring 
the possibility of an isotope reactor in Saskatchewan should be in the plans for the province.  He 
also added that the process should be expedited, building a research reactor within two to three 
years at the University of Saskatchewan.
105
  He acknowledged that while the construction of an 
isotope reactor in Saskatchewan would not solve the current isotope shortage, additional, small-
scale reactors, such as proposed by Saskatchewan, would prevent debilitating isotope shortages 
in the future.  On July 8, 2009, the provincial government and the University of Saskatchewan 
announced a formal partnership working to bring an isotope reactor to Saskatchewan.  The two 
parties delivered a proposal to the federal government for a 20-megawatt research reactor, the 
Canadian Neutron Source, at the University of Saskatchewan that could cost between $500 and 
$750 million to construct and $45 to $70 million to operate annually.
106
  The proposal asks for 
the federal government to pay for 75 percent of the construction costs and 60 percent of the 
operating costs with the provincial government covering the rest.  Minister Boyd added that 
these figures were just a proposal and that the Saskatchewan government knew that it might need 
to contribute more than the proposal states.  At the same time, however, the project would not go 
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forward without significant financial contribution from the federal government.
107
  The 
provincial opposition worried that committing to this project would make Saskatchewan 
vulnerable to future costs currently unseen.  The opposition also expressed concern that the 
proposal for an isotope reactor was a tool for bypassing the public consultation process.  
However, the Premier Wall and Minister Boyd assured the public that any development 
remained contingent on the results of the public consultation process. 
5.6 Public Consultations 
 The controversial nature of uranium politics draws both strong support and harsh 
criticism, putting pressure on government to follow public opinion closely.  From the beginning 
of the Saskatchewan Party term as government, the premier and cabinet promised public input 
into any decisions made with regard to the uranium industry.  Shortly after the release of the 
UDP report, the government followed through on this promise.  On April 8, 2009, the provincial 
government announced The Future of Uranium in Saskatchewan Public Consultation Process.  
Dan Perrins, a Senior Policy Fellow at the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy 
in Regina and former Deputy Minister to the Premier and Head of the Public Service between 
2001 and 2007, delivered a final report of the consultation process on August 31, 2009.  The 
process included: a week of stakeholders conferences with 46 organizations; four days of 
hearings with presentations from 61 organizations; public consultations in Yorkton, Estevan, 
Swift Current, Regina, Prince Albert, Buffalo Narrows, Lloydminster, North Battleford, 
Saskatoon, La Ronge, Stony Rapids, Fond du Lac and Wollaston Lake with 2637 attendees; and 
1275 pieces of correspondence from the public in the form of letters, emails, and other 
submissions.
108
 The government expected heavy engagement from the public in the uranium 
consultation process and stated uranium expansion depended on this process, but the extent to 
which public input mattered remained unanswered. 
 In stakeholder meetings hosted by the provincial government at the end of May, pro- and 
anti-nuclear groups assembled in Saskatoon to voice their opinions on the future of 
Saskatchewan‟s uranium industry.  As expected, organizations such as the Saskatchewan 
Chamber of Commerce gave support to the development of the uranium industry and nuclear 
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energy while, on the other hand, the Saskatchewan Environmental Society opposed nuclear 
energy over concerns of accidents and waste disposal.  Glen Tait, representing the National 
Farmers Union, argued that alternative energy sources such as wind, solar and biomass have not 
been given enough consideration.
109
  Anti-nuclear groups believed that energy discussions 
should include all possible alternatives, rather than just the viability of nuclear energy.  Because 
the UDP report served as the focus of the consultation process, some argued this limited the 
focus of the discussion.  Perrins immediately recognized that organizations and individuals 
wanted more information about both nuclear energy and other alternatives in order to form their 
opinions.  As well, concerns arose among those participating in the consultations regarding the 
length of the hearings, preferring a more exhaustive process.
110
  These became common themes 
moving from the stakeholder to the public consultations. 
 The first public consultation, on June 1, 2009, in Yorkton, set the tone for the rest of the 
process.  A videotape presentation from Richard Florizone, the UDP chair, provided information 
on the uranium industry and the conclusions drawn in the UDP report.  However, some 
individuals in attendance believed the UDP presentation provided too much positive support for 
nuclear energy without addressing any negative consequences.  Frances Thauberger, an 
individual at the Yorkton consultation, said, “There are always pros and cons with everything 
and it doesn‟t really seem right that we‟re only being shown the pros of nuclear.”  This statement 
received applause from other individuals in attendance.
111
  Catherine Cox and Danny Jewitt, also 
at Yorkton, expanded on this sentiment.  They felt that the consultation process failed to provide 
answers to many of their questions and that the final outcomes were already determined.   
 The Regina consultations held on June 4, 2009, hosted 400 people, many of whom 
soundly rejected the idea of nuclear energy.  However, John Hopkins, chief executive of the 
Regina Chamber of Commerce, spoke in favour at the Regina meeting.  “The more I read the 
report, the more that makes a lot of sense.  We have some of the dirtiest power generation in the 
country and clearly nuclear power is the way to address that,” he said, “I think the other 
opportunity is to become a centre of excellence in terms of research.”112  The crowd, mostly in 
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opposition to a nuclear reactor, again suggested that the discussion ought to include non-nuclear 
alternatives.   
 On June 8, 2009, in Prince Albert, a potential site for a nuclear reactor, the consultations 
drew almost 400 individuals.  Again, concern from the participants stemmed from wanting more 
answers and information on nuclear energy.  Marion Bear, from the Muskoday First Nation, 
stated, “there is no provision made for questions, answers, or anybody who‟s knowledgeable 
enough to answer some of the questions.  Also, the insufficient amount of information we‟re 
actually being given [sic].”113  As well as those unsure, the Prince Albert consultations attracted 
individuals in strong support and opposition to nuclear energy.  Opposition concerns ranged from 
the costs of implementing nuclear power to the problems associated with waste storage.  
However, some did not share these concerns.  Jim Smith said, “No, I really, really was not 
convinced at all.  In fact, a lot of the speakers who got up just loved to hear themselves talk, and 
what they were talking about was full of innuendo.”114  But despite some support for nuclear 
energy, the anti-nuclear movement effectively mobilized during the consultation process and this 
reflected heavily on the Dan Perrins report. 
 In the final report, Perrins organized his findings into 16 themes and 9 recommendations.  
The 16 themes, derived from the input from all participants in the consultation process, directly 
addressed topics in the UDP report and put forward new ideas the public found relevant.  These 
themes included: opposition to nuclear power generation, concerns about health, safety, and the 
environment, costs of uranium development and support for alternative energy sources.
115
  
According to Perrins, minimal public support for a nuclear reactor existed and, at the very least, 
the public wished to be better informed.  This included in-depth analysis of the costs and risks 
associated with nuclear energy as well as similar analysis into renewable energy sources.  Perrins 
suggested in his report that the province should produce a consolidated report on all potential 
power generation options.  This report should include an outline of all available options and the 
health, safety, environmental and economic variables for each of the options.
116
  Given the 
positive response in polls leading up to the consultation process, these themes and 
                                                 
113
 CBC, “400 attend uranium meetings in Prince Albert, Sask.,” CBC News, June 9, 2009. 
114
 CBC, June 9, 2009. 
115
 Perrins, 12. 
116
 Perrins, 15. 
69 
 
recommendations gleaned from public opinion likely came as a slight surprise to the provincial 
government. 
 Days after the release of the consultations report, Minister Boyd responded, “For us, this 
is a yellow light.  It‟s not a stop, or a go.”117  The Saskatchewan government remained reluctant 
to accept the results of the consultations, likely due to the nature of the issue.  The anti-uranium 
movement provided the strongest voice during the consultations and the province recognized the 
impact they may have on the process.  The government knew this outcome remained a 
possibility, given Saskatchewan‟s history, and the response from Boyd reflected this.  The 
possibility of nuclear power in Saskatchewan tempered even further when Premier Wall 
suggested that cost may be the issue with regard to nuclear energy, “I think cost, even for 
(nuclear) proponents and supporters, is the most important considerations…even for those who 
are comfortable with the health and safety, comfortable with the environmental implications, the 
cost issue is still there.”118  Wall stated that pursuing nuclear energy may force the province to 
rule out the pursuit of other new energy sources and he preferred SaskPower to not be reliant on 
a single energy source.  The economic downturn also proved catastrophic for the government.  
Trying to justify massive spending in a volatile economic climate created political problems.  
Although, he still believed that nuclear energy remained a possibility in the future, his statements 
implied that the public consultations in combination with the economy delivered a severe blow to 
government aspirations.  The anti-uranium movement proved effective in preventing the nuclear 
energy process from moving forward, forcing the province to rethink its strategy of whether 
nuclear energy remained a possibility for the future.  In December 2009, the provincial 
government delivered a final verdict of shelving nuclear energy for the short-term.  Minister 
Boyd explained, “when you look at all of those kinds of things – cost drivers, demand, all of 
those things – we are of the view that [nuclear power] is simply not something that meets with 
the need of Saskatchewan at this particular time.”119  However, he maintained that nuclear 
energy should remain a possibility in the future, possibly as soon as 2020.  Whether the 
economic downturn or negative public consultations played the key role in the provincial 
government‟s decision remains to be seen, but the political and economic climate altered enough 
to stop the process for uranium cycle expansion once again. 
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5.7 Bargains During the UDP Process 
 Following the Saskatchewan Party taking power, the government set to work establishing 
a network of bargains to evaluate and possibly expand the uranium industry.  In keeping with its 
election promise, the Wall government went to work building connections with both the industry 
and the community.  The province wanted to ensure an open process took place in the 
assessment of the uranium industry and created the UDP in an effort to accomplish this task.  
The UDP panel consisted of individuals from academia, the energy sector, the uranium industry, 
environmental groups, First Nations, and municipal and rural representatives.  These individuals 
aimed to evaluate and make recommendations for the future of the uranium industry.  The 
composition and intent of the UDP panel marked a sharp contrast to the process during the 
Blakeney era. 
 The variety of actors involved in the recent process enabled the Wall government to 
conduct an open analysis, looking at all avenues of expansion in the uranium industry.  As 
opposed to the Blakeney government, which selected a refinery as the beginning of the process, 
the Wall government emphasized the necessity to begin the process open to all possibilities.  
Before the UDP came into existence, however, the provincial government hinted that nuclear 
energy provided the most viable option for Saskatchewan and the UDP recommendations 
correlated with the Wall government‟s predictions.  The openness of the process, therefore, can 
be debated but the intent of including the diverse groups of actors in the UDP panel can not be 
ignored. 
 In focusing on expanding the uranium industry for the first time since the 1970s, the Wall 
government wanted to avoid the mistakes made in past attempts.  The lack of familiarity and 
coordination between government and industry during the Blakeney era played a significant role 
in the failure to construct a uranium refinery in Saskatchewan.  Today, mining corporations such 
as Cameco and Areva and the provincial government have normalized working relationships.  
Although most of these relationships revolve around regulatory and taxation policies, the 
familiarity between the state and market simplifies the process of creating new agreements.  
Because pursuing nuclear energy became the new policy objective the connections the province 
held with Cameco became invaluable with their links to Bruce Power, a major nuclear energy 
producer in Ontario.  Cameco first acquired 15% interest in Bruce Power in 2000, which it 
expanded to 31.6% in 2002.  The direct link with Cameco and the subsequent links to a nuclear 
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energy producer in Bruce Power placed Saskatchewan in a position to make a serious attempt at 
nuclear energy. 
 Beyond the strengthened relationships with industry, the province also focused on 
ensuring sufficient input from the public and non-government organizations.  The Wall 
government wished to emphasize the importance of input in the process from sources other than 
state and industry, including individuals from the First Nations community, Greenpeace, and 
urban and rural representatives in the UDP panel.  During the creation of the UDP, however, 
individuals from the environmental community argued that participation in the process remained 
futile and that the decisions on nuclear energy had already taken place.  At the end of the 
evaluation, to little surprise, the UDP recommended pursuing nuclear energy, but this 
recommendation gained greater legitimacy due to the diversity in the panel. 
 After the UDP recommendations became available to the public, the provincial 
government initiated the public consultation process.  As promised by the Wall government, the 
public consultations gave both the general public, as well as organizations not included in the 
UDP, to voice their concerns, approval, and disapproval on the conclusions made in the UDP 
report.  The consultations process indicated a predominantly negative public view towards 
nuclear energy, reducing the likelihood the province might pursue this form of energy.  At the 
same time, the economic prospects for Saskatchewan began to diminish.  The global economic 
downturn precipitated a similar downturn in Saskatchewan, further damaging the viability of 
nuclear energy. And in December, 2009, the provincial government stated that nuclear energy no 
longer remained in the current policy agenda and would be addressed at a later date. 
 The bargains during the recent attempt to expand the uranium industry exemplified the 
shift in governance styles from the 1970s to 2000s.  The Wall government put emphasis on the 
importance of industry‟s role in developing the uranium industry, although this emphasis partly 
came out of necessity.  As the relationship between state and industry evolved over the past 
decades, the interconnectedness between the two entities ensured cooperation.  In addition to the 
strengthened role of industry, the provincial government also focused on new bargains with 
communities and non-governmental organizations.  Giving representatives from a third segment 
of society a seat at the table traditionally reserved for state and industry marked a change in 
governance in Saskatchewan, as well as at the global level.  Broadening the range of input in the 
policy process allows for a more informed process but, more importantly, gives greater 
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legitimacy to the resulting policy.  For the Wall government, the value of legitimacy in any 
process involving the uranium industry could not be underestimated, particularly with regard to 
the process of past attempts to expand the industry.  Had the economic circumstances played in 
favour of expansion, the steps taken by the provincial government may likely have proved 
successful.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary 
 Saskatchewan‟s rich uranium history traces back to the 1930s, with the first discovery of 
the mineral in the province.  After twenty years of dormancy, the Canadian government 
displayed interest in the Saskatchewan uranium reserves to supply the American and British 
weapons programmes during and after WWII.  This became a major federal initiative and the 
Saskatchewan uranium era began.   
 For the next fifty years, the uranium mining industry was only modestly important to the 
provincial economy.  After experiencing steady growth for over a decade, the industry hit an all-
time low in demand after the end of purchases from the United States and Great Britain.  
Saskatchewan felt the effects of the downturn in the global market and, along with the rest of 
Canada, reduced the number of active mines.  Shortly thereafter, the creation of OPEC and the 
embargo it placed on oil forced governments to reevaluate their energy supply.  OPEC drove oil 
prices to record highs, and states looked to alternatives sources for energy security.  Nuclear 
power emerged as a popular alternative in Western nations, putting uranium back on the map. 
 The renewed strength of uranium allowed the Saskatchewan government to reassess its 
uranium policy and its place in the uranium industry.  During the 1970s, uranium upgrading 
responsibilities rested with Ontario, a fact the Blakeney NDP government hoped to change.  The 
Saskatchewan government revised mineral policy and created a new, pro-business Crown 
corporation, SMDC, to attract new uranium ventures to the province.  Eldorado Nuclear, a 
federal Crown interested in constructing and operating a new uranium refinery, became one of 
the initial targets of the new policy and Saskatchewan became a potential site.  The province and 
Eldorado Nuclear began discussions on how to proceed and developed a three-phase site 
assessment process.  After Eldorado Nuclear indicated it had selected the most viable location, 
the province requested alternative sites remain in contention.  This request stemmed from the 
growing anxiety in the public.  As a result, the two parties failed to come together before the 
federal inquiry on the viability of a Saskatchewan site.  During the inquiry the public hearings 
encouraged mobilization of a well-organized anti-nuclear movement in the province.  Because of 
the combination of disagreement between the provincial government and strong concern from 
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the general public, the federal inquiry could not approve a refinery for the province.  The option 
for value-added expansion was shelved for over 25 years. 
 In the following two decades, the Saskatchewan uranium mining industry continued to 
grow.  As uranium mined in the province continued to supply energy and medical demands 
around the globe, SMDC and Eldorado Nuclear merged assets to create Cameco Corporation. 
Control ultimately passed from state control to public control through series of divestitures.  
Cameco grew into the largest high-grade uranium producer in the world, making Saskatchewan 
the largest uranium producer.   
The 2007 provincial election ushered in a new round of discussions of uranium 
expansion.  The Saskatchewan Party hoped to revisit the issue of value-added uranium 
development and, after taking control of the provincial legislature, created the Uranium 
Development Partnership to evaluate potential growth in the industry.  The UDP submitted a 
report the provincial government and advised expansion into the nuclear energy industry, a 
recommendation welcomed by some and rejected by others.  The Saskatchewan government 
went to work on the recommendation, displaying public support for nuclear expansion and 
engaging in discussions with potential reactor operators such as Bruce Power.  At the same time, 
the anti-nuclear movement worked to gain support amongst the undecided public.  Before any 
decision making could occur, the government promised a public consultation process to gauge 
opinion throughout the province in an effort to learn how to move forward with nuclear energy.  
The public consultations revealed strong skepticism throughout the province and, once again, 
showcased the organization of the anti-nuclear movement.  Due to global economic events, the 
strength of the provincial economy also ebbed after the submission of the UDP report, raising 
doubts over the ability of the government to finance this massive project.  The combination of 
the consultation process and the weakened economy leaves the future of Saskatchewan nuclear 
power in limbo.  The events over the past two years, though, provide interesting comparisons to 
the expansion attempt of the Blakeney era. 
6.2 Discussion and Implications 
 Despite mining uranium for over fifty years, only two substantial attempts at expanding 
the value-cycle have been made in Saskatchewan.  While some might argue neither was 
successful because the economic and commercial case simply did not support the initiatives, the 
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processes that unfolded reveal much about how governing processes have changed in 
Saskatchewan over the past quarter century. These two attempts give insight into the nature of 
provincial politics and the politics of the uranium industry.  Both attempts, the uranium refinery 
and the nuclear reactor, emerged initially in the face of positive economic conditions and strong 
political leadership; nonetheless, differences in their respective processes could spell different 
outcomes between the refinery, which ended in failure, and the nuclear reactor, the outcome of 
which is yet to be determined.   
 A key distinction between the refinery efforts and the pursuit of a reactor stems from the 
circumstances which drove their specific avenues of expansion.  On the one hand, although the 
Blakeney government first looked at any option for value-added expansion, the refinery proposal 
became the single option for the Saskatchewan government after it recognized Eldorado 
Nuclear‟s need for the facility.  The process, therefore, was structured largely as a project-based 
endeavour, somewhat analogous to Teisman‟s phase model.  On the other hand, the Wall 
government desired expansion in the uranium industry after analysis and evaluation of all 
possible options of energy supply.  From this evaluation, conducted by the UDP, the current 
government accepted the recommendation of pursuing nuclear energy.  These two events 
illustrate examples of the evolution in governance and of the changing role of the provincial 
government, as it appears to be operating more with a streams or rounds style of policy 
making.
120
   
 In the refinery era, the provincial government carried out decision making in a state-
centric manner.  The decision to court Eldorado Nuclear came without an election mandate or 
any other form of public approval, a fact that became apparent when the attempts to purchase 
land for the refinery surprised the public. In the state-centric model the decision-making process 
remained closed, further limiting the input to and the options for government.  For the Blakeney 
government, the refinery process held two outcomes - success or failure, construction or 
termination.  The closed, rounds-based policy process prevented the state from adapting to 
changing circumstances, severely limiting the options for the Saskatchewan government. 
Today, the process is deliberately more complex, underlining the evolution of governance 
structures and processes in policy making.  In an issue as contentious as the uranium industry, 
Wall‟s Saskatchewan Party included determining the viability of uranium expansion as a major 
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plan of the party platform to ensure public awareness during the election campaign.  By winning 
the election, the Saskatchewan Party judged that it had received a mandate from the public to 
pursue this policy.  This election mandate, however, remained insufficient, and the government 
moved to the next step in the process, an independent viability study.  The UDP report 
represented an evaluation of the uranium industry separate from government, a procedure 
common in the phase and rounds models of policy making in governance today.  The UDP also 
served as an avenue for multiple actors from a variety of backgrounds to become involved in the 
process.  The inclusion of individuals from the corporate sector, the environmental sector, and 
the community (including First Nations) exemplify a marked change from the refinery era.  For 
the Wall government, the importance of giving more people a seat at the table rests both in the 
knowledge and the legitimacy these individuals bring to the process.  Although both the refinery 
and the reactor eras reached the public consultation process, the federal government initiated the 
refinery hearings.  In the process today, the provincial government planned public consultations 
from the beginning and kept the entire process relatively open and transparent throughout.  The 
differences in the respective processes rest in the changes in policy systems over the past three 
decades. 
 The policy system in place today encourages, perhaps even requires, input from a broad 
range of actors into the policy process, particularly one as complex and involved as the uranium 
industry.  During the refinery proposal the policy system allowed little collaboration between 
government, corporations, and communities and interest groups, and this resulted in a truncated 
policy process which severely limited potential for development.  This system forced the 
Blakeney government uranium policy to live or die, with a specific project.  Because the Wall 
government enjoys more flexibility with the evolution of the policy process, it is more able to 
adapt to changing circumstances, as seen with the shift from nuclear power to nuclear medicine 
and nuclear research.  Although the older model of policy making allowed governments to force 
through policies more easily, not all policies were successful under this model (i.e. the refinery). 
A large part of this failure can be attributed to the public hearings, a sign of change in the policy 
system. 
 For both the refinery and reactor processes, the public consultations proved more 
problematic for government and industry than expected.  Whether or not the Blakeney 
government fully recognized the potential impact that the anti-nuclear movement could bring to 
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the process during the hearings, this movement proved instrumental in ending the hopes for a 
Saskatchewan refinery.  In contributing to the outcome of the policy process, the refinery public 
hearings emphasized the importance of direct citizen participation.  Opening all policy debates to 
the public input remains impossible but, in the case of issues as contentious and complex as 
uranium and energy, gauging public support or opposition serves as a useful policy tool.  How 
well public hearings gauge overall public opinion, however, is a debatable issue itself.   
 During the reactor process the Wall government assured the public that open 
consultations would take place and that the outcomes of these consultations would play into the 
final decision making.  Despite planning the public consultations and knowing that the public 
consultations were one of the crucial components for the refinery failure, the provincial 
government appeared slightly surprised by the outcome.  Polls leading up to the consultations 
displayed substantial levels of support for nuclear energy, yet support in the polls did not 
translate into support in the open forum.  In the current situation, the result of the consultations 
may not matter, and may serve only as an excuse for other factors such as the unexpected 
provincial economic downturn and the large capital investment required for a nuclear reactor. 
 Before the nuclear energy consultations took place, the Saskatchewan government began 
to change its message with regard to uranium expansion, once the strength of the provincial 
economy declined.  Nuclear energy slowly moved into the background.  The speech delivered by 
Premier Wall to the Canadian Nuclear Association, though still supportive of uranium expansion, 
did not convey the same level of support for nuclear energy as expressed in earlier statements.  
After his speech, the government continued to put forth a positive message, but managing both 
corporate and public expectations became increasingly challenging to the nuclear development 
issue.  Saskatchewan increasingly felt the effect of the recession in the global economy, and the 
government realized that selling a multi-million dollar reactor to the public seemed increasingly 
unfeasible.  Although Bruce Power argued that the province could start the planning phase now 
and make payments a few years down the road, this type of commitment would permanently tie 
the provincial government to a nuclear reactor project, a potential problem without any future 
economic certainties.  The possible combination of encountering weaker economic conditions 
down the road, and the tremendous amount of money committed to a contentious project could 
contribute to defeat for the current government in the next election.  A nuclear reactor for 
medical purposes, therefore, presented the best option in the current circumstances.  This type of 
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reactor would receive significant federal funding and selling a medical project to the public 
remains an easier task. 
 If the expansion of the nuclear cycle remains a possibility in the future, two critical areas 
need to be addressed.  First, the Saskatchewan government must wait for the ideal economic 
conditions before moving forward.  At the beginning of the current effort to bring nuclear energy 
to the province, the economic conditions appeared ideal: the international economy remained 
strong, and the Saskatchewan economy began to peak.  If these conditions were sustained 
throughout the process, the Saskatchewan government would likely be in the planning and 
development stages of nuclear energy.  Therefore, first and foremost, the provincial government 
needs the economy to re-strengthen before nuclear energy can even be considered.  Second, the 
government needs a massive public information campaign.  If the economy remained as strong 
as the pre-recession period a public campaign may not be necessary.  In this scenario, the 
government possesses enough financial freedom to make an executive decision.  However, ideal 
economic conditions remain unlikely to persist for an extended period of time and, therefore, 
shoring up more public support for a nuclear energy project may become necessary to win future 
elections.  Although presentations made by the UDP during the public consultations favoured 
nuclear energy, a lack of information became the overwhelming response from those in 
attendance.  While a public campaign would do little to change the minds of those firmly in 
opposition to the uranium industry and to the production of nuclear energy, it could gain support 
from undecided individuals.  Government provided information on nuclear energy directly 
answers one of the major questions during the public consultations, and could prove a difference-
maker in future attempts for nuclear energy and future provincial elections. 
 The refinery debate in the 1970s and the nuclear energy debate from 2007-2009 
exemplify the changes in governance models and processes.  The security structures during the 
refinery era continued to be driven by the Cold War and the bipolar system.  Understandably, the 
state held control over regulation, as well as production and distribution during this period and 
the focus on security meant state control permeated the other two structures.  Holding control 
over regulation and production meant that the state also controlled the institutions responsible for 
credit and knowledge.  The provincial and federal governments financed the majority of uranium 
endeavours in Saskatchewan and as seen in the Blakeney government‟s attempt to expand the 
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cycle, resulted in a closed process.  The lack of familiarity between the provincial government 
and industry created obstacles and disagreements in the process that could not be overcome.   
 The nuclear energy debate displayed a different style of governance, designed to avoid 
many of the problems associated with governance in the 1970s.  From beginning to end, the Wall 
government aimed at keeping the process open and transparent.  The lines of communication 
between government, industry and the community have improved over the years.  The increased 
diversity of control over the four major structures removes traditional power from the state but 
creates improved conditions for relationships between state, market, and society.  The state still 
controls the security structures, but leaving production structures primarily in the hands of the 
market and allowing academic institutions greater influence in the knowledge structures places 
emphasis on predictability and routine between the interconnected actors.  Given more 
favourable economic conditions in 2008 and 2009, Saskatchewan might have begun the first 
stages of nuclear energy development.  The failure of the recent nuclear energy process to move 
forward lies primarily with conditions set by outside economic forces, while the failure of the 
refinery process rests with the inability of the internal structures (state, market, and society) to 
cooperate and come to agreement. 
6.3 Limitations and Areas for Further Research 
 This study compared the governance structures of two key events in Saskatchewan‟s 
uranium industry: the refinery debates and the nuclear power process.  While the refinery debates 
ended 25 years ago, the nuclear power process continues.  The joint submission from the 
Saskatchewan government and the University of Saskatchewan for an isotope reactor remains in 
consideration.  The analysis in this thesis, therefore, ends before the current process has been 
completed. 
 Also, this thesis aimed at providing a complete story of the Saskatchewan uranium 
industry by concentrating on two key events within the story.  Deeper analysis into these two 
events, such as structured interviews with relevant participants and mapping connections 
between pertinent actors, may elicit a fuller understanding of the governance structures, why 
specific decisions were made, and how outcomes emerged.  As well, a question of efficacy in 
democratic participation and engagement enters this thesis, particularly with regard to the public 
consultations.  Further research into which types of public participation (voting, open 
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consultations, referendums, polling, focus groups) elicits the most valuable input into a policy 
process may help inform how certain policy outcomes emerge.  
Finally, the analysis in this thesis focused solely on the Saskatchewan uranium industry.  
Despite a notable change in governance structures and processes within the province, the 
outcomes were similar.  To better gauge the significance of different governance structures, 
further research could include a comparison of foreign uranium industries.  Looking at the 
governance structures and consultation processes in nations such as Sweden, Finland, Germany 
and France may offer a better comparison of governance models. 
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